



A Proof Of God

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God, proof, Gödel, Leibniz, logic

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ABSTRACT *In this paper, we prove that both Gödel's and Leibniz's proofs of God contain fallacies. We also present a new proof of God based on knowledge, and this new proof seems not to contain mistakes of logical order.*

Introduction

The concerns of human kind with scientifically proving the existence of God are actually not negligible.

A quick search with the tool Lycos¹ returns 114,000 documents for the key-words "proof of god" *journal scientific*².

Why these doubts would ever appear in the mind of a believer would be a good question to ask.

Someone who does not believe in God however, say someone who claims to be an atheist³, could have plenty of reasons to ask this question.

It is known that Gödel (HighBeam, 2010) read The Bible every day:

The first is Gödel's reticence. "Although he did not go to church," his wife Adele told the logician Hao Wang shortly after Gödel's death in 1978, he "was religious and read the Bible in bed every Sunday morning." But fear of ridicule and professional isolation made him reluctant to talk about his faith. "Ninety percent of contemporary philosophers see their principal task to be that of beating religion out of men's heads," he wrote to his mother in 1961.

It is perhaps with the intents of cajoling the scientific community that he writes his proof then.

Leibniz was apparently more explicitly a believer (Roinila, 2007):

Judging by modern standards Leibniz can be situated in a long list of apologetic (*apologetics*, 2003) authors, which originates from Plato. Leibniz thought his philosophy to act as an argument on behalf of Christianity, which is evident in many of his writings, notably in Theodicy. Theological matters are present in every aspect of Leibniz's output - even in his mathematical writings. His work with the church reunion is mainly to be traced from his correspondence.

Leibniz was then on a mission, which was defending Christianity, when he wrote his proof.

Notice that Gödel is regarded as one of the most important logicians ever (Kennedy, 2007):

Kurt Friedrich Gödel (b. 1906, d. 1978), "established, beyond comparison, as the most important logician of our times," in the words of Solomon Feferman (Feferman

1986), founded the modern, metamathematical era in mathematical logic.

Leibniz is regarded as a genius (Look, 2007):

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) was one of the great thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and is known as the last "universal genius".

It is here that we notice that a person has to be able to detach themselves from their passions when doing Science because we will exhibit clear-cut evidence on the existence of fallacies on the proofs of God presented by both thinkers in this piece.

We will also present a new proof of God, which we believe is free from fallacies.

We are also believers, but we have been to the side of Atheism for at least one year in our life, and this when already adults, and we read The Bible as if it were a book to be studied during this year. That is when we actually got convinced of the logic involved in all and that is when we felt miracles were possible and actual at least sometimes.

When writing our proof, we are not trying to convince anyone that God exists, even because we do not believe in preaching as such. We are just going through a logical exercise and trying to find a way of convincing people that there is something beyond what is commonly seen by us in human kind.

Even so, we do ask you to have with us the same disrespect we had with the *human gods of Science*, so please do look for fallacies.

In case some be found, or in case there be a belief that some has been found, please give us the opportunity to rewrite our proof (if we are still around and in human shape).

Development

Gödel, or those whose proofs have been associated with Gödel's name in the literature so far, does not have a valid proof of God

We never had direct access to the material written by the own Gödel on the topic.

We work with what we have found available on the World

Wide Web.

(u.a., 2012) brings the following as Gödel's proof of God:

$$\begin{array}{l}
 \text{Ax. 1. } \{P(\varphi) \wedge \Box \forall x[\varphi(x) \rightarrow \psi(x)]\} \rightarrow P(\psi) \\
 \text{Ax. 2. } P(\neg\varphi) \leftrightarrow \neg P(\varphi) \\
 \text{Th. 1. } P(\varphi) \rightarrow \Diamond \exists x[\varphi(x)] \\
 \text{Df. 1. } G(x) \iff \forall \varphi[P(\varphi) \rightarrow \varphi(x)] \\
 \text{Ax. 3. } P(G) \\
 \text{Th. 2. } \Diamond \exists x G(x) \\
 \text{Df. 2. } \varphi \text{ ess } x \iff \varphi(x) \wedge \forall \psi \{\psi(x) \rightarrow \Box \forall x[\varphi(x) \rightarrow \psi(x)]\} \\
 \text{Ax. 4. } P(\varphi) \rightarrow \Box P(\varphi) \\
 \text{Th. 3. } G(x) \rightarrow G \text{ ess } x \\
 \text{Df. 3. } E(x) \iff \forall \varphi[\varphi \text{ ess } x \rightarrow \Box \exists x \varphi(x)] \\
 \text{Ax. 5. } P(E) \\
 \text{Th. 4. } \Box \exists x G(x)
 \end{array}$$

As seen in (Philosophy Index, 2002), uppercase Roman letters point at individual propositions, so that P, from the first axiom, could mean x is a Greek letter, and be presented as P(x), for instance.

Wisman (2014) would prefer saying that *x* is a Greek letter is a propositional function in P(x) and when we put P together with x we get x is a Greek letter.

Wisman (2014) will also tell us that the curly brackets of the first axiom, if we neglect the square brackets, contains a message of type φ has some property, so say φ is blue, and it is necessarily the case (Garson, 2014) that we have whatever is inside of the square brackets happening to all elements of the type x.

Lowercase Greek letters, according to (Philosophy Index, 2002), would mean formulae, and a formula may be anything: proposition, formula or several connected formulae.

If we find a counter-example involving a proposition however, that has to be good enough to put down the first axiom, and therefore the first step of the supposed proof of God.

We then call Phi *having a unique model of steering wheel*, like a wheel of type y, let's say, which is manufactured to match a specific model of car.

Assume that this specific model of car, and let's call it M, can be manufactured by at least two different companies.

In the universe of companies that manufacture M, however, only company N makes use of our particular model of steering wheel.

Now call x car.

Call Psi to belong to M.

Call P to belong to the only company that manufactures M with y.

We then have:

It is necessarily the case that every car that has wheel of type y is a car of model M.

It is a fact that every car with wheel of type y is a car that belongs to the only company that manufactures that sort of car, with wheel of type y (this company is N).

Therefore, every car that is of model M is manufactured by that only company that manufactures that sort of car, with wheel y (and therefore by N).

Since there are cars of model M that are manufactured by other companies (at least two manufacture it), we know we have a fallacy.

If we have a fallacy on the first line of the proof, we know that we do not have a proof.

The first line of the proof receives the tag *axiom*, which should be something we respect without having any proof.

The problem with simply assuming that something obviously equivocated is true is that we can only reach useless conclusions, logically speaking. We know that, in Classical Logic, if the antecedent of an implication is false, then everything is implied by it (Wisman, 2014). This is a famous logical principle called Ex Falso Quodlibet. In this case, we can prove anything we choose using the first line we have been given. Yet, we have proven nothing because in the same way that the consequent is true, its negation would also be. The Ex Falso Quodlibet Universe cannot be trusted therefore or is *logically useless*.

Dehaan (2013) brings the following information to us:

Sometime between 1941 and the 1970s, Gödel wrote a brief mathematical proof that God exists. Later, Dana Scott edited the original proof. Decoded Science offers a brief summary of this proof, which has five axioms that we assume to be true:

- Any "property", or the negation of that property, is "positive"; but it is impossible that both the property and negation are positive.
- If one positive property implies that some property necessarily exists, then the implied property is positive.
- The property of being God-like is positive.
- Positive properties are necessarily positive.
- The property of necessarily existing is positive.

Gödel added three definitions along the way:

- A "God-like" being has all positive properties.
- An "essence" of a being is a property that the being possesses, and that property necessarily implies any property of that being.
- The "necessary existence" of a being means that it is necessary that all the essences of that being exist ("are exemplified").

We notice that there was some change between the first version of the proof we presented here and this one, and the change was meaningful.

Now the first step is correct according to the paradigms of Classical Logic, for the well-known Law of the Excluded Middle (Stanford University, 2014) tells us that either something is true or the negation of that something is, but never both the assertion and the negation of that something.

The second step seems to be incorrect: The own source defines *positive* as *the same as true* if we consider what is known about Classical Logic so far. If we then replace the term they are adding to our Classical Logic lingo, and adding in a non-standard or unacceptable way, we then have that *a certain property is true implies that some property necessarily exist. Thus, the implied property is true.*

This could be referred to as Modus Ponens (Conrad, 2008) rule. The problem is that we would need to have the antecedent happening to say that the consequent follows. Nobody is telling us that the antecedent happens, and that is where the problem appears.

We obviously need to satisfy the demand of the antecedent to have the consequent happening in Classical Logic. There is a chance that the chosen property (certain property) is never true. In this case, the other property may not exist, what then tells us that the other property may not be true. On the other hand, if the property of the antecedent is true, then, if we assume that the assertion is true, the consequent has to be true, what then means that the property of the consequent is verified.

The third step clearly contains a fallacy.

Why would the property *being God-like* be true?

We then know that this proof, of the source (Dehaan, 2013), is also not a valid proof.

According to Fapson (2013), we could be writing Gödel's proof of God in another way:

- Everything has a property
- Certain properties are "positive"
- Properties that are "positive" are consistent
- The property "God-like" is "positive"
- Thus there is something in the world that has the property "God-like"

We could perhaps choose the fourth step on this one: Why would the property *God-like* be true?

Besides, a property has to be true or false regarding a subject, but we do not have the subject on the third step: Who is it that has got the property *God-like*? If we assume that *the who* is the entire human kind, then we will be in trouble, right? We think that that is not what they meant, since that would trivialize God and make us all be God.

Perhaps what they meant is that the property *God-like*, which must be *being a God-like entity* instead, is that there exists someone who has the property *God-like* because we feel that there is or say that there is or whatever.

We are then just saying that, because some of us say that or feel that, that must be true, that is, God must exist.

Notwithstanding, this is not a logical proof of God. This is more like an expression of our human reasoning in a code that is similar to the code used by Classical Logic.

On page 6 of (Segre, 2009), we do see the definition III.2, which is the Axiom 1 of our first proof here, so that we know there is no chance we have a valid proof of God on (Segre, 2009) either.

Leibniz, or those whose proofs have been associated with

Leibniz's name in the literature so far, does not have a valid proof of God

Once more, there is some difficulty in choosing the right sources for this piece. Some of our sources, from when we first wrote about the topic (Pinheiro, 2003), have already disappeared.

Look (2013) tells us that Leibniz's proof of God was:

- (1) God is a being having all perfections. (Definition)
- (2) A perfection is a simple and absolute property. (Definition)
- (3) Existence is a perfection.
- (4) If existence is part of the essence of a thing, then it is a necessary being.
- (5) If it is possible for a necessary being to exist, then a necessary being does exist.
- (6) It is possible for a being to have all perfections.
- (7) Therefore, a necessary being (God) does exist.

Premise number (2) is already a bit

controversial: *Perfection is an absolute property.*

Perfection is a personal concept, ultra personal, instead. In the end of 2001, for instance, we thought that Tom Cruise was absolutely perfect (just like ourselves, by the way).

Would we not find people on earth to say that his nose is too big, or that he is too short, or that he is promiscuous, or that he is homosexual, or that he is a drug addict, or a coward, or a criminal, and others, like all depending on their *personal experience with Tom Cruise and their own concept of perfection?*

How come this is an absolute property then? It is obviously a super relative one instead. Perfection is also not a simple property: It has to be a complex property instead.

What sort of definition of *simple* are we considering here? If we ourselves think that someone is perfect, we are thinking of morality, physicality, partnership, virility, and things like that. Is that simple? A person must have almost all qualities that we can think of, if not all of them, for us to think that they are perfect. That has to be super complex, not simple.

Existence is a perfection? Once more, that would have to be a non-absolute classification, and therefore one that cannot be used in any logical proof.

If we are suffering violation of human rights, especially of the most serious type, such as slavery, brain-washing or torture, how come we would not think, probably for the entire amount of time in which we are in that situation, that *human existence is absolutely imperfect*, like it is something absolutely undesirable. If we have spiritual beliefs, then we would still think that we are losing because of being alive and we would not have lost had we not been born, so that this is an absolute imperfection, rather than just an imperfection. Since we cannot really believe that (2) is a rational move (one step is enough), this is not a proof of anything (therefore this is not a proof of the existence of God and this is also not a proof of the existence of a necessary being). We find the following citations in (Colorado, 2014):

from Leibniz, "The Monadology" (1714):

"... we can find no true or existent fact, no true assertion, without there being a sufficient reason why it is thus and not otherwise, although most of the time these reasons cannot be known to us. ...

"There is an infinity of figures...of minute inclinations.... Now, all of this detail implies previous or more particular contingents, each of which again stands in need of similar analysis to be accounted for, so that nothing is gained by such analysis. The sufficient or ultimate reason must therefore exist outside the succession of series of contingent particulars, infinite though this series be. Consequently, the ultimate reason of all things must subsist in a necessary substance, in which all particular changes may exist only virtually as in its source: this substance is what we call God."

from Leibniz, "The Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason" (1714):

"...now we...make use of the great...principle that nothing takes place without a sufficient reason; in other words, that nothing occurs for which it would be impossible for someone who has enough knowledge of things to give a reason adequate to determine why the thing is as it is and not otherwise. This principle having been stated, the first question which we have a right to ask will be, 'Why is there something rather than nothing?'.... Further, assuming that things must exist, it must be possible to give a reason why they should exist as they do and not otherwise.

"Now this sufficient reason for the existence of the universe cannot be found in the series of contingent things.... Although the present motion...arises from preceding motion, and that in turn from motion which preceded it, we do not get further however far we may go, for the same question always remains. The sufficient reason, therefore, which needs not further reason, must be outside of this series of contingent things and is found in a substance which...is a necessary being bearing the reason for its existence within itself; otherwise we should not yet have a sufficient reason with which to stop. This final reason for things is called God."

from Leibniz, "On the Ultimate Origination of the Universe" (1697):

"Besides the World, that is, besides the aggregate of finite things, there is some dominant unit...[that] not only rules the world, [but] also makes or creates it. It is superior to the world and, so to speak, beyond the world, and is therefore the ultimate reason for things. Neither in any single thing, nor in the total aggregate and series of things, can the sufficient reason for their existence be discovered. Let us suppose a book...to have existed eternally, one edition having always been copied from the preceding: it is evident then that, although you can account for the present copy by reference to a past copy which it reproduces, yet, however far back you go ...you can never arrive at a complete [explanation], since you always will have to ask why at all times these books have existed, that is, why there have been any books at all and why this book in particular. What is true concerning these books is equally true concerning the diverse states of the world, for here too the following state is in some way a copy of the preceding one (although changed according to certain laws). However far you turn back...you will never discover in any or all of these states the full reason why there is a world rather than nothing, nor why it is such as it is.

"You may well suppose the world to be eternal; yet what

you thus posit is nothing but the succession of its states, and you will not find the sufficient reason in any one of them, nor will you get any nearer to accounting rationally for the world by taking any number of them together: the reason must therefore be sought elsewhere. Things eternal may have no cause of existence, yet a reason for their existence must be conceived. Such a reason is, for immutable things, their very necessity or essence; while in the series of changing things, even though this series itself may be supposed *a priori* to be eternal, this reason would consist in the very prevailing of inclinations. For in this case reasons do not necessitate (that is, operate with absolute or metaphysical necessity, so that the contrary would imply contradiction), but only incline. Hence it is evident that even by supposing the world to be eternal, the recourse to an ultimate cause of the universe beyond this world, that is, to God, cannot be avoided.

"The reasons [sufficient, full, complete] for the world are therefore concealed in some entity outside the world.... Thus we must pass from the physical or hypothetical necessity, which determines the later states of the world by the earlier, to something endowed with absolute or metaphysical necessity, for which no reason can be given. For the actually existing world is necessary only physically or hypothetically, but not absolutely or metaphysically.... Since therefore the ultimate root of the world must be something which exists of metaphysical necessity, and since furthermore the reason for any existent can be only another existent, it follows that a unique entity must exist of metaphysical necessity, that is, there is a being whose essence implies existence. Hence there exists a being which is different from the plurality of beings, that is, from the world; for it has been granted and proved that the world does not exist of metaphysical necessity."

In *Monadology* (according to (Colorado, 2014)), we have Leibniz confessing that he is an epistemologist in what regards true things, is it not? If every true thing has a cause and it is just that this cause may not be known to us, then we do not have enough knowledge, right?

Interesting that he talks about sufficient, but not necessary, reason. This way, he may be letting us to think that even if the thing happens to independently be true we can invent a reason for it that will be sufficient to determine its truthness.

Still in *Monadology* (according to (Colorado, 2014)), Leibniz says that there is an infinity of little contingent facts connected to things and if we bother trying to study those we will find another infinity of little contingent facts that connect, so that that is worthless. However, according to him (Colorado, 2014), we then are sure that there is a necessary entity that contains, in its virtual part, all those contingencies attached to all those facts, as if it were the parent of those.

Notice that we have already identified the flaw contained in this reasoning on the second paragraph about the topic: The argument leaves room for us to imagine that the cause is not a necessity, but a contingency, that is, something we may invent that does the trick of creation. In this case, there is no necessary creator and what is said after that does not follow.

Why would it be the case that from a succession of infinite contingencies we would have a necessary generator? We believe it is missing a premise here if this is supposed to be a valid argument.

The second citation contained in (Colorado, 2014) goes a bit beyond in reasoning than the first citation does. It now explains that he is after a sufficient reason that needs no further reason, what is something we had not been told that far. The main question that appears in our mind is then *why, all of a sudden, this?* Why would we assume that we cannot keep on going forever on contingent reasons? The other question that appears in our minds, soon after the just-mentioned one, has to do with the meaning of *contingent* and *sufficient* in this argument. It appears to us that these terms are not antonyms, so that they could happen at the same time. They are also not mutually exclusive and could therefore have a strong intersection. If something happens, then we have the true thing we talked about. Otherwise, we may not have it. This would be a suitable sequence of steps following their reasoning, so that contingent and sufficient actually equate at least sometimes, and this fact invalidates the argument.

As for the third citation contained in (Colorado, 2014), we could concentrate on the extract *for it has been granted and proved that the world does not exist of metaphysical necessity*, for instance, since we have seen no convincing proof of the assertion, but we can also say that it repeats the logic of the other two citations and therefore contains the same flaws in reasoning.

What is added however, and we do notice that at least one point of strength of argument gets added each time we go down on the list of citations contained in (Colorado, 2014), is the illustration, which gives us a magnificent explanation as to why he believes that there is something of a different nature and yet necessary that generates the thing that is true: The books that copy other books and could never have been generated, in the very beginning of their existence, by the own books. It is clear to all of us that a person must have invented the first book, and we therefore understand that it is something of different nature and of a nature that seems to be much more solid, complex, and necessary for the creation of all than the nature of the book itself is.

The problem with this reasoning is the same we see with the *proofs by enumeration*, which have been abandoned by Mathematics in the case of infinite sets. For those, we have created the *mathematical induction* out of necessity, since we could always miss some element and that could be the element for which our supposed rule would not work.

It is incomplete reasoning.

It is missing proving to us that the so nice and beautiful model of sequence involving the books could be applied to everything else that is true, so that we could think of finishing all in God.

We again do not have a valid proof of God, unfortunately.

We do have a proof of God that probably does not contain any fallacy

We can never find out how it all started because there is always an unanswered question, and we know for sure

that there will always be at least one unanswered question whilst we are limited to the human shape.

Notwithstanding, we have decided that all is knowledge, and all is achievable through it.

If all is knowledge, but our existence is not enough to cope with certain pieces of knowledge, and one piece is enough, say the never-answered question, then there is something or someone who has *the knowledge* and that someone or that something is not part of human kind.

The knowledge must belong to someone or something because otherwise it would not be knowledge, would be another thing.

Knowledge has to belong. Knowledge cannot exist *per se*.

Who has it then?

Nobody who is alive and is a human being has it.

Therefore, the dead or the about-to-be-born might have it if it belongs to humanity somehow.

Not mattering to whom it belongs, it is something beyond *the living creatures*.

It could not be that the living creatures who are not human beings have it because they clearly know less than us.

Therefore it belongs to a non-human entity in *our sense* of non-human, for we have decided that the body on its own cannot have knowledge, like perhaps devices inside of it can have knowledge, but not the dead body.

The truth is that there is also a chance that knowledge belong to the *about-to-be-born*. Now we have a blurred area: Are the *about-to-be-born* human beings or not?

If we decide that they are, and that *the knowledge* belongs to them, then perhaps knowledge belongs to human beings, is it not?

However, if we can never access what they know through them, would it not be better excluding them from human kind in terms of mental maps?

Their knowledge cannot belong to human kind anyway.

The body can have knowledge if the person is in it, if the human being is alive. We do not call the corpse human being. We call the corpse *dead human being*, therefore *non-human being*. We do not call the *about-to-be-born* human being, we call them *human being in formation*, therefore we call them *non-human being*.

Now call this *non-human entity*, who has *the knowledge*, God and we then have a proof of the existence of God based on epistemic beliefs that are universally seen as lies

of human kind!

REFERENCE

1: PO Box 12396 A'Beckett St, Melbourne, VIC, AU, 8006 ||| 2: HYPERLINK "<http://www.lycos.com>" www.lycos.com ||| 3:<http://search.lycos.com/web?q=%22proof+of+god%22+journal+scientific&keyvol=00b4f26b525d5640ffc1> ||| 4: <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/atheist> ||| 5: Obs.: We have called our article with Semiotica A Solution to The Sorites to copy the name of our talk at the Newcastle University in 2000. However, we never wanted to call either of them A Solution for we were sure we were the only ones who had the solution instead. That was all because of Graham Priest. He insisted that we called our work that way. This little piece, however, we call A Proof of God for willing to call it this way. We are sure that there are zillions of proofs of the existence of God. This is just one more. | HighBeam Research. (2010). The God of the Mathematicians: David P. Goldman Explores the Religious Beliefs That Guided Kurt Gödel's Revolutionary Ideas. Retrieved June 17 2014 from <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-231408031.html> | Roinila, M. (2007). The Reunion Of The Churches. Retrieved June 17 2014 from <http://www.helsinki.fi/~mroinila/reunion.html> |