



## How to set-up Vyāpti; According to Nyāya

### KEYWORDS

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**ABSTRACT** *Vyāpti is referred as the verve of inference. Vyāpti means a correlation that exist between two factors. It has Vyāpti and VisamVyāpti are referred as two kinds of Vyāpti. SamaVyāpti means Vyāpti which exist two terms of equal extension concomitance whereas VisamVyāpti means a relation of non-equipollent concomitance that occurs between two terms. Vyāpti is referred as an invariable connection which exist between the middle and the major term. Vyāpti is established only by the uncontradicted experience of the relation, which exists between two things.*

*It has been said that the Nyāya method of induction is analysed into five steps only and they are as follows*

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|----------------------|-------------------------------|
| (a) Anavaya          | (b) Vyatireka                 |
| (c) Vyabhicharagraha | (d) Upadhinirasa              |
| (e) Tarka and        | (f) Samanyalaksana perception |

*Anavaya is referred as a relation of agreement that exist between two things that are found in the presence only. Vyatireka means a relation of agreement that exist between two things that are found in the absence only. In Vyabhicharagraha, we observe no contrary instance. It has been said that here, one of them is present without the other. Upadhinirasa is the elimination of upadhis. Upadhis means a conditions on which the relation may possible is dependent. Tarka and Samanyalaksana perceptions have their own literal meanings according to Naijayikas*

Vyāpti literally means pervasion. Vyāpti implies a correlation between two facts, of which one is pervaded (vyāpti) and the other pervades (vāpaka). A fact is said to be pervaded by another, if it is always accompanied by the other. To take the illustration of smoke and fire, smoke is pervaded or always accompanied by fire; and fire pervades or always accompanies smoke. The hetu or middle term is pervaded by the sādhya or a major term and the sādhya always pervades the hetu. Wherever there is smoke, there is fire. But wherever there fire, there may not be any smoke. There are cases of smokeless fire. e.g., a red hot iron. Vāpti is, thus, the pervasion of the hetu by the sādhya.

Vyāpti may be of two kinds – samaVyāpti and asamaVyāpti or visamavyāpti. Vyāpti between two terms of equal extension is samavyāpti, e.g. 'nameable' and 'knowable'. What is nameable is knowable, and vice versa. As distinguished from this, Vyāpti between two terms of unequal extension is asamaVyāpti or visamavyāpti, e.g., 'smoke' and 'fire'.

The Indian schools of philosophy do not separate induction from deduction. Inference, according to them, is deductive in character. But the schools of Indian philosophy differ among themselves with regard to the method of establishing the universal proposition (vyāpti) on which inference depends.

The Cārvaka recognizes perception as the only source of knowledge. No generalization from observed particular facts is possible. Vyāpti cannot be established, and, thus, inference is not possible.

The Buddhist holds that vyāpti is based on the principles of causality (tadutpatti) and identity in essence (tādātmya). Two things related to each other as cause and effect are

universally related to each other, so that we can infer the cause from the effect, and the effect from the cause. Identity is the relation between genus and the species included in it. A śimśapa is a species of the genus 'tree'. They are identical in essence. From this we know that all are trees. The Buddhist regards the principles of causality and identity in essence as necessary and universal truths which are the presuppositions of all experience. They cannot be derived from experience. Hence vyāpti, according to the Buddhist, is not the result of generalization.

The Advaita Vedānta holds that vyāpti is established by uncontradicted experience of agreement in presence between two things. When we find in numerous cases that two things always go together, and there is no exception to this, we may take them to be invariably related.

The Naiyāyikas agree with the Vedāntins in holding that vyāpti is established by the uncontradicted experience of the relation between two things, and not on any a priori principle like causality or essential identity. They, however, go further than the Vedāntins and supplement uncontradicted experience of the relation between two facts by tarka or indirect proof and by sāmānyalaksana perception. The Nyāya method of induction or generalization may be analysed into the following steps:

First we observe that there is a relation of agreement in presence (anavaya) between two things, or that in all cases in which one is present, the other also is present, e.g., wherever there is smoke, there is fire.

Secondly, we see that there is uniform agreement in absence (vyatireka) between them, e.g. wherever there is no fire, there is no smoke. These two steps taken together correspond very well to Mill's Joint Method of Agreement

in presence and in absence.

Thirdly, we do not observe any contrary instance in which one of them is present without the other (*vyabhicārāgraha*). From this we may conclude that there must be a natural relation of invariable concomitance between the two things.

Fourthly, we should know that the *vyāpti* which is thus established is also unconditional. For this we are to eliminate the conditions (*upādhanirāsa*) on which relation may possible depend. The conditions can be eliminated by repeated observation (*bhūyodarsana*).

*Vyāpti* that is established with so much care may be challenged by the sceptics like the *Cārvāka*. The sceptics may ask: what is the guarantee that the relation will hold good in distant future? To end this doubt, the *Naiyāyika* fortifies the induction or *vyāpti* by indirect proof or hypothetical argument (*tarka*). If the proposition 'wherever there is smoke, there is fire' is false, then its contradictory, 'Sometimes smoke is not accompanied by fire' must be true. It means that there may be smoke without fire. But cannot be true, since effect cannot exist without the cause. If it is argued that sometimes there may be effect without causes, the *Naiyāika* will point to the practical contradictions (*vyāghāta*) involved in the position. If there may be smoke without fire, then why does one require fire for a smoke of cigar?

Still the *Naiyāyika* feels that a generalization from particulars is necessary as mere particulars cannot give us the certainty which we claim for our proposition 'wherever there is smoke, there is fire'. The knowledge of *vyāpti* can be made absolute by *sāmānyalaksana* perception only. Through the perception of universal 'smokiness' we perceive all cases of smoke. We apprehend the universals of fire and smoke by *sāmānyalaksana* perception and realize their invariable relation. The statement 'A, B, C are mortal' means that they are mortal, because they are men, and not because they are A, B, C. We apprehend the class-essence or universal 'method' in A, and with this class-essence we apprehend the relation of mortality. Thus induction or *vyāpti* is a generalization from the particulars of experience through the knowledge of class-essence or universal underlying them.

## REFERENCE

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