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STRAINS AND RADICALIZATION AMONG SYRIANS YOUTH REFUGEES IN JORDAN

Social Science

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to explore the relationship between strains and youth radicalization among Syrian refugees in Jordan. Moreover, it aims to describe the prevalence and causes of Syrian refugees' radicalization in Jordan.   A sample of 714 (65% males and 35% females) Syrian youth refugees, both males and females, was selected.

Findings of the present study showed an alarming average percentage (46.7%) of the prevalence of radical thought, beliefs and intentions among the refugees. Around a third of the sample were victims of violence, a fifth had been perpetrators of violence against others, and around half of the sample had participated in a fight. More than half of the sample feel inequity and around half of them feel unjust. A significant positive relationship was found between radicalization and general stains, unemployment, victims of violence, perpetrators of violence and low self-control. Moreover a significant positive relationship was found between low self-control and radicalization, and a negative relationship was found between radicalization. Three major causes of radicalization were identified: (1) Personal causes: age, religion, prayer, religion effect, religious compliance, anger, fear, low self-control, and use of force. (2). Family causes: Family size, number of employed persons in the family, father's education, mother's education, and mother's job. (3). Societal causes: lack of feeling equity, low life satisfaction, and life stress events. Findings raised the attention to the youth refugees pose threats and security's vulnerabilities. Moreover, it calls the attention to the take in account encountering radical beliefs dissemination among youth refugees. Policy and security measures are discussed.

KEYWORDS:

Radicalization,   Syrian refugees, Jordan, Youth.

INTRODUCTION

Jordan has faced negative consequences of regional instability (i.e., in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria). Chaos in Syria triggered a flood of refugees across Jordan's northern border. The downtrodden by the deep state and the black hole states in most Arab Spring states and Syria and Egypt are the ultimate model in that served as a pervasive reminder of the potential consequences of revolution—further demonizing, and suppressing the Jordanian social movements and Jordanians appetite for political change. The Syrian refugee population became demonized too and a scapegoat for national challenges that predated the refugee crisis, Indeed, negative perceptions of the Syrians deflected Jordanian public attention to the national challenges. Syrians are highly concentrated in Jordan's most vulnerable communities, and grievances. (Francis, 2015).Jordan's Za'atari, the first official refugee camp that opened in July 2012.Azraq, a camp opened in April 2014, is well designed to provide a sense of community and security, with steel caravans instead of tents, a camp supermarket, and organized "streets" and "villages." (REACH, 2014).

Due to the existence of a "youth bulge" and youth high share in the population in most Arab societies, Youth play a prominent role in social change, social movements, Arab Spring, political violence and crises (Al-badayneh, 2017a, Al-badayneh, 2017b Goldstone, 1991; 2001, Zakaria, 2001). As a consequence youths   are often the main protagonists of criminal as well as political violence (Urdal, 2012). As Zakaria, argues that youth bulges, combined with slow economic and social change, have provided a foundation for an Islamic resurgence in the Arab world (Zakaria, 2001, p. 24). At the same line Huntington (2001) added the dimension of age structure to his "Clash of Civilization", he said "I don't think Islam is any more violent than any other religions […]. But the key factor is the demographic factor. During the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s there were high birth rates in the Muslim world, and this has given rise to a huge youth bulge. But the bulge will fade. Muslim birth rates are going down; in fact, they have dropped dramatically in some countries" (Huntington, 2001, p 1) (Urdal, 2012).

Many refugee families feel trapped, crowded, and even farther from any sense of home, so they seek shelter in nearby towns. According to the U.N., more than half of all Syrian refugees — roughly 2.5 million — are under the age of 18. Most have been out of school for months, if not years. About 35,000 school buses would be needed to drive every young refugee back to Syria. The youngest are confused and scared by their experiences, lacking the sense of safety and home they need. The older children are forced to grow up too fast, finding work and taking care of their family in desperate circumstances (Mercy, 2017).

The vast majority of Syrian refugees come from rural areas in Syria; relatively young population, and lower education. More than half (60 per cent) of the Syrian refugees above the age of 15 have never completed basic schooling, and only about 15 per cent of the refugees have completed secondary education, Also only 65 per cent of Syrian children are enrolled in basic schools. By the age of 15 less than 40 per cent of Syrian children are enrolled in school. When it comes to the work experience and background of the Syrian refugees living outside camps, 63 per cent of the men participated in the labour market in Syria before the revolution started in March 2011, while at the same time the unemployment rate was 17 per cent. At present, about 51 per cent of the Syrian men living outside camps participate in the Jordanian labour market, while the unemployment rate is as high as 57 per cent. Only 7 per cent of Syrian women participate in the Jordanian labour market, which is similar to their participation rate in Syria before the crisis. The unemployment rate of Syrian women before they became refugees in Jordan was about 28 per cent, while the present unemployment rate for Syrian women living outside camps is 88 per cent. Syrians who live outside camps in Amman, Irbid and Mafraq mainly worked in industries of construction (23 per cent), wholesale and retail sale (23 per cent), manufacturing (16 per cent), transportation and storage (10 per cent), and agriculture, forestry and fishing (9 per cent). With respect to occupations, Syrian refugees living outside camps today mainly worked as craft and related trade workers (39 per cent), service and sales workers (22 per cent), plant and machine operators and assemblers (12 per cent), and as skilled agricultural, forestry and fishing workers (7 per cent) before the Syrian revolution started in March 2011. At present, more than 40 per cent of employed Syrians outside camps in Amman, Irbid and Mafraq work in the construction industry, while 23 per cent work in the wholesale and retail trade and repair industry, 12 per cent in manufacturing, and 8 per cent in the accommodation and food service industry. When it comes to occupations, 53 per cent of the Syrian refugees employed outside camps work as craft and related trade workers, 24 per cent as service and sales workers, and 12 per cent in elementary occupations.(Stave

and Hillesund, 2015).Approximately 24% of all Syrian refugees in Jordan are women of reproductive age (15-49 years) and almost 53% are children under 15 years of age; 18% are under five years of age. Nine out of ten registered refugees in Jordan are either already defined as poor or soon will be. According to a World Bank/UNHCR report, there is also evidence that poverty among refugees increased between 2013 and 2015(World Bank Group and UNHCR, 2016) (Jordan communication, Advocacy and policy activity, 2016)approximately in 2015 one in eight individuals currently residing in Jordan is Syrian, 2.96 million of people lost their jobs during the conflict. Total economic loss since the start of the conflict until the end of 2014 is estimated at USD 202.6 billion (Syrian Centre for Policy Research (SCPR) (2015), Verme, Gigliarano, Wieser, Hedlund, Petzoldt, & Santacroce, (2016). UNHCR , 2015).

Refugees flows can be a source of regional conflict, causing instability in neighboring countries, triggering external intervention, and sometimes providing armed refugee groups with base camps from which to conduct insurgency, armed resistance, and terrorist activities (Loescher,2002). The negative public attitudes and sentiments toward Syrians constrain the Jordanian government in its ability to respond to the refugee crisis. As host-community tensions rise, Jordanian citizens have called upon the government to limit competition from Syrian refugees. Since 2014, the Jordanian government has responded to increasingly vocal public frustration and growing regional security risks by narrowing its hospitality toward Syrian refugees. Jordan has restricted the number of Syrians who can enter the country, closed accessible border crossings, and attempted to confine more refugees to camps. (Francis, 2015).

Syrian Refugees in the region
Statistics shows around five refugees (registered, January 2017 and around six million refugees (based on UN estimate, March 2016 (UNHCR, 2017). There are around five million Syrians scattered throughout the region, making them the world's largest refugee population under the United Nations' mandate. It's the worst exodus since the Rwandan genocide 20 years ago. More than 5 million Syrian refugees are in just four countries Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq:

• Turkey hosts 2.7 million Syrian refugees, more than any other country worldwide
• Lebanon hosts approximately 1 million Syrian refugees which amounts to around one in five people in the country
• Jordan hosts approximately 1.27 million Syrian refugees(USAID, 2016), (JHAS. Jordan Health Access and Utilization Survey 2015).
• Iraq where 3.1 million people are already internally displaced hosts 228,894 Syrian refugees (UNHCR, 2016, UNRWA, 2017).

The UN's 2016 humanitarian appeal for Syrian refugees was just 56% funded by the end of November 2016. 93% of Syrian refugees in urban areas in Jordan are living below the poverty line, as well as 70% of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, 65% in Egypt and 37% in Iraq. According to the UN around 13.5 million people are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance inside Syria. The number of people displaced within Syria is expected to rise to 8.7 million by the end of 2016. The 5 countries which border Syria (Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey) have closed their borders to people fleeing the conflict. Ongoing conflict in Syria, including recent attacks in Aleppo, will likely lead to more people trying to flee Syria. Between January and September 2016, Syrians made up the largest nationality of those crossing the Mediterranean to get to Europe (26.2%). In total, 224,694 resettlement and other admission pathways have been pledged globally since the start of the Syria revolution, which equates to a mere 4.7% of the total population of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt and Turkey. At least 480,000 people in the five main host countries - or 10% - are in need of resettlement according to the UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR. Russiahas also offered zero resettlement places. Germany has pledged 43,431 places for Syrian refugees via resettlement and other admission pathways; about 46% of the combined EU total. Excluding Germany, the remaining 27 EU countries have pledged around 51,205 places via resettlement and other admission pathways, or around 1% of the Syrian refugee population in the main host countries Germany and Sweden together have received 64% of Syrian asylum applications in Europe between April 2011 and October 2016(UNHCR, 2016). Approximately half of the 1.27 million Syrians living in Jordan are registered refugees, and an unknown proportion of the other Syrians currently in Jordan. As the

conflict in Syria enters its fifth year, over 6.5 million Syrians have been internally displaced and almost 4.4 million are registered refugees. Jordan is hosting an estimated 1.27 million Syrians, of whom 646,700 are registered refugees. The Jordan National Census of 2015 gives a total population of 9.5 million people;, (UNHCR , 2015).While approximately 100,000 Syrian refugees live within camps, an estimated 85% live outside camps, and most of them are classified according to criteria used by the UNHCR Vulnerability Assessment Framework Steering Committee as 'extremely vulnerable.' (MOPIC, 2015).

The U.N. estimates that only 1 in 10 Syrian refugees live in camps. The rest are struggling to settle in unfamiliar urban communities or have been forced into informal rural environments. One demographic that is largely overlooked is adolescents. The consequence of forgetting the unique needs of this next generation is they will become adults who are ill-equipped to mend torn social fabric and rebuild broken economies. Investing in adolescents now will yield dividends for decades to come for the peace and productivity so desperately needed in Syria and the region.(Mercy, 2016)

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Strains and radicalization
General Stain theory (GST))Agnew,1984, 1985, 1990, 1992, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c, 1995d, 1997, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2002, 2006, 2010& 2006, Agnew et al., 1996, Agnew & White, 1992(Agnew (2001) proposed that strain is more likely to lead to crime if it (1) is perceived as unjust, (2) is of high magnitude, (3) is associated with weak social bonds, and (4) creates incentive to engage in criminal coping (e.g., exposure to delinquent peers and opportunity). Such strains cause negative emotions favorable to crime, reduce the ability to cope in a noncriminal way, reduce the perceived cost of crime, influence criminal dispositions, and expose the individual to delinquent peers and opinions.(Agnew, 1992, 2001). Strains that are associated with low levels of social control, such as a lack of parental supervision and sanctioning, low attachment to family, and low commitment to conventional norms, are more likely to lead to crime   (Agnew, 2001). Agnew (2001, 2006) specifies the kinds of strain most likely to lead to delinquency. Among these are criminal victimization (including victimization of close others and the anticipation of one's own victimization), child abuse and neglect, and negative school experiences. Agnew (2002) included "vicarious" strain (i.e., victimization and violence against others to whom an individual is close) and "anticipated" strain (i.e., the expectation that current strains will continue or new ones will occur). Vicarious victimization of close others is high in magnitude, likely to be seen as unjust, and occurs in situations with low social control (Agnew, 2002).

Exposure to strain causes a range of negative emotions, such as anger, disappointment, depression, fear, and anxiety, and individuals will employ different types of coping strategies in an attempt to alleviate the strain and strain operates as a driving force that puts individual under unpleasant state, and pushes them restore the normal state. If law-abiding, adaptive coping strategies are unavailable or ineffective, law-violating, maladaptive coping becomes more likely – especially if the individual experiences high levels of anger in response to the strain. Maladaptive coping is but one possible coping response, and its probability is conditional on a number of internal and external factors (Agnew, 1992). On one hand legitimate skills and resources lead to increase the likelihood of deviant behavior (radical behavior) (i.e., poor problem solving skills, social skills and low constraints (Agnew, 2006). on the other hand strong social support and strong relationship with family and significant others lead to the likelihood of conformity and social accepted behavior.

According to the GST The goal of behavioral coping is to either eliminate or avoid the strain or satisfy a need for revenge (Agnew, 1992). Behavioral coping can be adaptive or maladaptive, and examples include skipping school, running away, ending a friendship, or engaging in a range of criminal/delinquent behaviors. Emotional coping strategies directly address the negative affect experienced by the individual in an attempt to find relief from the discomfort of psychological distress. Examples include the use of alcohol or other drugs, physical exercise, disordered eating practices, or risky sexual behavior. Emotional coping is distinct from the other forms of coping in that it tries to directly alleviate the psychological distress rather than behaviorally alter or cognitively reinterpret the situation (Agnew, 1992). General strain theory emphasizes the problem-solving or

"coping" nature of delinquent or risk-taking behavior (Agnew 1992, 2001) where negative behavior may (1) be a means of escaping aversive situations, or, (2) when escape is not possible, result in an emotional "strike out" (i.e. anger) (Agnew 1985).
Low self-control and radicalization

As the General Strain theory proposed Low self-control leads to negative coping strategies with strains. Moreover, poor relationship with significant others, socialization and poor parenting lead to low self-control and to negative coping strategies with strains. The general theory of crime (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990), which proposed that low self-control correlated with impudent and delinquent behavior .Criminal Character is a result of poor parenting (e.g., failure to punish bad behavior), from childhood, low self-control reduces the ability to resist the immediate gratification of crime Individuals low in self-control are: "impulsive, insensitive, physical (as opposed to mental), risk-taking, short-sighted, and non-verbal" (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). Law self-control and opportunity to commit a crime lead to criminal behavior (radical behavior). (Arneklev, Elis & Medlicott, 2006;Grasmick, Tittle, Bursik, and Arneklev, 1993) Gottfredson & Hirschi's (1990), generality hypothesis in that self-control not only predicts offending behavior, but also analogous behavior. Analogous behaviors are those that, while not criminal, are similar in that they satisfy immediate desire to the detriment of long-term consequences. Examples of analogous behaviors include smoking, drinking, using illicit drugs, having children out of wedlock, and engaging in risky sexual behavior. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) suggest that individuals low in self-control are likely to engage in risky sexual behavior, although this speculation has not been empirically confirmed. Additionally, previous studies have focused on the relationship between self-control and antisocial deviant behaviors. Yet, an important element of self-control is a preference for exciting and thrilling experiences. Thus, to the extent this preference for risk-taking is characteristic of such individuals, self-control might be related to socially accepted forms of risky behavior. (Jones & Quisenberry, 2004).

The Ecological Process of Radicalization
In a similar vein, the ecological model (Heise's (1998, Usta and Singh, 2015, Nikolic-Ristanovic, 2000; Stark & Wessels, 2012, & Waldmann, 2007) proposed that during wars, people are dislocated from their daily routines, lifestyles, and support networks, they must secure alternative shelter, food, and income for themselves and their families. With limited resources or access to viable employment, young women may drop out of school, marry young, accept low-paid jobs, or take on risky work, such as prostitution. an altering of community-level norms about wife beating (Waldmann, 2007). As a consequence to the war situation and strains violence increses (intimate partner violence IPV and domestic violence DV). For Heise's (1998) and Usta and Singh (2015) they argued that during wars, variables associated with violence against women operate at four levels: (1). structural (patriarchy and degree of gender inequality, poverty level, breakdown of legal system, and displacement), (2). community (altered sex ratio, changing societal norms, desensitization, access to weapons, and hosting/being hosted as a refugee), (3). relationship(shift in gender roles, loss of social safety nets, and ethnic/religious differences), and (4). individual (loss of income, insecurity, compromised psychological functioning, and coping mechanisms). More specifically ,Usta and Singh, (2015) argue that an increase in IPV during wars and civil conflicts is   an extension of power asymmetry that underlies pre-existing gender inequalities in many societies (Nikolic-Ristanovic, 2000; Stark & Wessels, 2012). In patriarchal societies, men's responses to stress are often aggressive and violent as they release their own frustrations and emotions and attempt to gain some power and control over their lives. Accordingly, armed conflicts place significant stress on individuals. Repeated traumatic experiences (direct or indirect), feelings of insecurity and instability, scarce resources, displacement, loss of income, uncertainty about the future, and death or disability of a close friend or family member, all serve to tax individuals' coping mechanisms (Usta, Masterson, & Farver, 2016). Skjelsbaek (2001) argues that public violence increases among refugees when there is an increase in the level of frustration which is often inflicted on weaker individuals.

The Greed and Grievance Perspective on Radicalization
Both the opportunity and the motive perspectives are focusing on economic, political and social structural features to explain individual-level decisions associated with joining a rebel or terrorist organization

or not. The greed perspective, focuses on structural conditions that provide opportunities for a rebel or radicals group to wage war against a government (Collier, 2000; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). These are conditions that provide the rebel group with the financial means to fight, or factors that reduce the cost of rebellion, such as unusually low recruitment costs for rebel soldiers. Paul Collier, has suggested that relatively large youth cohorts may be a factor that reduces recruitment costs through the abundant supply of rebel labour with low opportunity cost, increasing the risk of armed conflict (Collier, 2000, p. 94). According to the opportunity perspective, rebellion is feasible only when the potential gain from joining a rebel or terrorist organization is so high and the expected costs so low that certain individuals will favour joining over alternative income-earning opportunities. The motive-oriented tradition, or grievance perspective, has its origins in relative deprivation theory and tends to see the eruption of political violence as a rational means to redress economic or political grievances (Gurr, 1970, p. 223). Motives for committing political violence can be economic, like poverty, economic recession or inequality, or political, like lack of democracy, absence of minority representation or self-governance. Most of the literature on youth bulges and political violence falls into this tradition. It focuses on how large youth cohorts crowding the labour market or the educational system, confronting lack of political openness, and agglomerated in urban centers may feel aggrieved, paving the way for political violence (e.g. Goldstone, 2001) (Urdal, 2012).

STRAIN, RADICALIZAION & REFUGEES
The previous models share a fundamental integrated assumptions about radicalization. It states that ecological sources of sever, high magnitude, harmful and stressful stains (i.e., economic, political, and social) operate as driving force to eliminate their uncomfortable status. the situation generates negative coping strategies including radical behavior, terrorist acts, violent radicalization, deviance and violence. It creates low self-control and internal negative emotions (i.e., fear and depression, and anger) and external negative emotions(i.e., feeling unjust and inequality) Accompanying with opportunity that valuate such adaptation in a threading situation and blocking access to survive, safety and security. In short, stains and low self-control. Strains may increases low self-control drive youth to engage in violent radical behavior. Strains can reduces refugees abilities to resist the immediate benefits and rewards of joining radical and terrorists groups, taking into account their limited and blocked access to the legitimate goals and services.

In the refugees situation it is more than blocking the access to the legitimate means. It is the detach from their own home, city, job, future, dream and country. It is a total block of every aspect of their normal life mixed with threat, violence and destruction.

Syrian refugees may have experienced the worst refugees' crises in the present time. Millions of citizens have forced to fled their homes, communities and country. They have trapped in cross fire of multi-conflicting players internally and externally. Internally, Chaos and destruction, humiliation, fear, and threat to their personal basic human needs and rights, and security threat. Daily death, violence, killing of their love ones and destruction for their properties. They have become a battle field for their own national army, where tanks and jet fighter have dropped "barred bombs" and opened their fire on their own people, destroying their own country to protect a dictator ruler (AlAssad). Allowing all types and groups of mercenary fighters and allies such as Huzb Allah, Russian, ISIS, and more than 67 radical and terrorists group to operate in their country. Externally, Refugees forcibly moved to high risk, fearful journey to find a safe place to live and protect their families. A situation that has produced a multi-sever strains on every individual and family. As can be expected vicarious victimization is high among Syrian refugees and leads to high magnitude strains. In return such strains leads refugees to join radical and terrorist groups or to flee the country.

In the typical life the refugees especially young youth are under psych-social crises. Immigration crises represents additional impact of strains causes the emergence of a range of negative feelings. Everyday have experiencing threats to their safety and security, block of access to legitimate goals and services, war, destruction, violence and rising multiple threats by radical, violent, terrorist and militant groups. Refugees has experienced high magnitude strains accompanied with negative feelings (internal and external). Youth radicalization in this sense can be seen as a cumulative socio-psychological process that can

be emerge or eliminate by socialization and empowerment. Depending on the level and severity of the radical behavior, it can be seen as a deviant (general radicalization)and criminal behavior (violent radicalization).

Youth refugees have forced to adopt negative coping strategies as mean for their survival, safety and security. Other adopting religious strategies that attributed their crises to their destiny. using behavioral coping can be used by refugees to eliminate strains and fear or as a strategy for revenge from other terrorist and militant groups. Also they use emotional coping can be used as avoidance like drug use and other risky behavior.

All types of strains that refugees have faced for years can produce radicals, extremists, and terrorist, when taking in account the widespread collective religious and ethnic militant radical groups operating in Syria. These groups have internal within and between conflict and external conflict. Any Syrian citizen can be a multi-target for many terrorist and militant groups and be a scapegoat (i.e. ISIS and Huzbaalah). Such strains create a motive to join a terrorist groups not from ideological point of view, but for mutual interest, in search for protection. In the absence of state and order an anomic society is exist and total absence of law and regulation. A situation of unrest and total chaos. Following Agnew's line of theorizing, when negative behavior the only mean of escaping a strain, fearful and chaos situation, the only path to cope may be the violent path (turning to the terrorist and fighting groups).

Empirical support for the impact of strain in the area of buylling and imprudent behavior, terrorism and radicalization came from Al-badayneh, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2016, 2017a, 2017b,), Al-Badayneh, Al-khattar, and Al Hassan (2011), Al-Badayneh, Al Hassan, and Almawajdeh(2016), Al-Badaynehand Al Hassan (2016), Al-Badayneh, Khelifa, and Al Hassan (2016), Al-Badayne, Al-Assasfeh, & Al-Bhri (2016). Schweizer (2007) suggested that the impact of social structure and stains on both radicalization and terrorism facilitate the activities of radicals and terrorist groups (Al-badayneh, 2009). Heish and Pugh (1993) provide a meta-analysis study for the relationship between poverty, income inequality and violent crimes. In (34) studies yielded (76) correlation coefficients, all but two (74 study or 97%) are positive correlation between poverty, income inequality and violent crimes (Heish & Pugh, 1993). Considering the supply side of terrorism, Berrebi (2003) argues that high standards of living and education are positively associated with participation in terrorist activities (Krueger & Maleckova, 2003).Syrian refugee women in Lebanon reported intimate partner violence (IPV), harassment, and community violence. women experienced difficult living conditions characterized by crowding and lack of privacy, adult unemployment, and overall feelings of helplessness. In encountering such circumstances, they used negative coping strategies, including justification and acceptance of IPV and often they physically harmed their own children due to heightened stress. Syrian refugee women in high demand for training them in positive coping strategies and establishing support groups would help them face IPV that occurs in refugee settings. (Usta, Masterson, &Farver, 2016).A survey of Iraqi refugees in Syria indicated a potential relation between financial stress and IPV. Wars place a strain on the couple relationship by shifting gender roles and power dynamics. Women are most often the focus of attention for relief and protection agencies. In addition, women may have greater ability to find work and earn income for the family, while men lose their role as "provider" and "protector," making them feel powerless. IPV can constitute a means for men to reaffirm their power over women and over their families (Munn, 2008).

In Lebanese, many people were losing their jobs due to the available and cheaper Syrian labor force. Therefore, there was unfair competition for scarce services and food resources, and a fear that the violence in Syria would spillover to Lebanon. Moreover, the discrimination reported in aid distribution has further exacerbated overall community tensions and could lead to internal disputes within the refugee community, weakening their social support network (Usta, Masterson, &Farver, 2016).

METHOD
Sample.
A sample of 714 (65% males and 35% females) Syrian youth refuges males and females was selected.With average age 16 years (sd= 1.4), family size 6.4 persons (sd=1.9), 28% of families no one employed. As

a fact in the Arab world, illiteracy rate is high among women more than men (14% vs. 11% respectively); high school (58% vs. 51%); on the undergraduate level rate men were higher than women (32% vs. 25% respectively). Also unemployment rate was higher among women (70% vs. 17%), may be due to the social norms and security, in addition to the low level of education and limited work opportunity in a country which has already high unemployment rat
The demographic profile of the refugees showed that they are religious (89% pray), committed to the religion rules (82%) and complying with the religion practices (82%). Refugees have experienced violence as victims (28%) and as perpetrators (21%), participated in fight (49%), uses force (50%), and cheated (51%).

(Table 1). Moreover, refugees felt low level of equity, justice, pride and life satisfaction (60%, 75%, 82%, & 72% respectively). In additional they felt anger (66%) and fearful (38%). Finally, refugees have experienced different life-stressors such as death of love ones, (61%), divorce (25%), illness (40%), unemployment for love ones (50%), crises (50%), and family problems (31%)

Research Tool
A questionnaire has been developed based on the previous research especially Aspar Radicalization scale (KSA). The questionnaire is consisted of demographic information, family information, social variables, feeling of justice, equality and national pride. Also it contains religiosity variables, use of force, criminality, violence and life stress events and low self-control. And finally radicalization scale consisted of two scales one violent radical scale and General radicalization scale.

Validity and reliability. Construct validity is estimated a construct validity of the general scale was estimated by the calculating the correlation between radicalization scale and low self-control scale and found a positive significant relationship (0.818, α= 0.000), another estimates was by the relationship between Life Stress Events and radicalization, it was a significant relationship (0.127,α=0.00), and with violence (0.131,α=0.00)a sign of validity of the scale. A Reliability of the scale is strong and was estimated by Cronbach's alpha and was 0.82.

FINDINGS
Prevalence and Level of Radicalization
Findings of the present study showed an alarming average percentage of the prevalence of the radical beliefs was found (46.7%) among the sample. Table2 shows the top radical statements (50% and above). The highest statement by Syrian refugees was that they believe Muslim is grievance in the world, this include feeling of unfair and injustice. Second highest statement was about the use of violence against women (rape), a situation most frequent occurred to women internally and externally during conflict and war times. With the high social value and taboo about honor of the women which represent the family hone and threated by rape. Rape is not only a commit of sexual or violent act, it has a negative social label and affect all members of family and relatives. In most cases a revenge from the perpetrator and the victim (honor killing) to avoid the stigma.

Table (2) Top Radical Statements (50% and above).

Mean (all)

#	#	statement	Agree	
			#	%
1	44	Muslims feel grievance in this world	502	70.3
2	36	I consider the rape of a girl from my religion as the rape of my sister.	479	67.1
3	1	In my country, women must be prevented from traveling to foreign countries alone	454	63.6
4	34	I consider the offend to a man of my religion, is offend to my father.	450	63.0
5	35	I consider the trial of a young man from my religion, is a trial for my brother.	449	62.9
6	33	I am committed to the consensus of my relatives in all issues	440	61.6

7	43	Who is not with us is against us	421	59.0
8	40	What young people need is a rigorous education	419	58.7
9	31	Religious law should be the sole source of authority.	411	57.6
10	38	To obey all types of authority what students should learn	410	57.4
11	10	I believe that the martyrs in the name of God revives religion	395	55.3
12	37	A female with an intimate relationship outside the marriage should be killed.	382	53.5
13	30	What police are doing is most important than demonstrations to demand freedom	372	52.1
14	3	In my country, women should not have equal rights with men	360	50.4

Most radical attitudes and thoughts are concentrated on Group centrism and social identity including religious believe. As can be seen from the top high radical statements where the focus was on Muslims grievance, rape one from my religion, women traveling abroad, old man of my religion, young man of my religion and consensus with my relatives.

Causes of Radicalization
As can be seen from the diagram (1), A significant relationship is found between radicalization and general strains, negative feelings, unemployment, religiosity and violence.

General Stains. Syrian refugees has confronted sever negative micro-macro strains. Refugees has forced double jeopardy: (1)internal stains including but not limited to war, terrorists groups(i.e., ISIS), regime's crimes, external interventions (i.e., Russia), militant groups (i.e., Huzballah), and (2) **external strains** of being refugees with all it means to be a refugee and uncertain future. to leave third homes and cities. On the micro level, refuges left homes, losing love ones, destruction of their homes and cities, losing their valuable properties, forcing them to move to a new another disaster and chaos, where no home, no job, no sense of belonging or security and a continuous threat to their lives and existence. Refugees has faced other types of strains such as death, divorce, unemployment, and illness of love ones. In additional family problems, social and familial problems. As can be seen from the diagram (1), a positive significant relationship is found between radicalization and general strain (0.127, α=0.00). negative feelings (0.157, α=0.000), and negative relationship with religiosity (-0.238, α=0.00).

Life satisfaction. As expected life satisfaction has a negative significant relationship is found between life satisfaction and general strains (-0.166, α=0.00). Moreover, a positive significant relationship is found between radicalization and religiosity (-0.096, α=0.01). Religious people are happy with life regardless their harsh situation and hard living. At the same time a negative significant relationship is found between radicalization and religiosity (0.238, α=0.00).

Low self-control. How refugees react on individual level to the bad situations they are encountering. Low self-control is one measure of how people act in different situation. Some people may act in a positive way, taking a positive feelings and positive adaptation mode. Others with low self-control take a negative adaptation modes such as drugs, crime violence and radicalization. People with low self-control usually have a personality traits such as impulsivity, simple tasks, risk taking, physical activities, self-centered, and temper (Grasmick, Tittle, Bursik and Arneklev (1993)).Moreover, a positive significant relationship is found between radicalization and low self-control (0.509, α=0.000).

Religiosity. Religiosity protect refugees from negative feeling and negative adaptation modes. Believing that this is part of their density and they have to accept that and try to deal with such situation. A negative significant relationship is found between radicalization and religiosity (-0.096, α=0.001).

Negative Feelings. General strains may generate negative feelings which may lead to maladaptation such as violence and radicalization. Negative feelings cab be seen as a response to social strains. A positive significant relationship is found between negative feelings and low

self-control (0.203, α=0.000); religiosity (0.068, α=0.02). Moreover, a strong positive significant relationship is found between negative feelings and maladaptation modes (radicalization 0.167, α=0.000), victims of crimes (0.158, α=0.000, and Perpetrator of violence 0.149, α=0.000).


**Figure 1 Ecological levels of radicalization**

Diagram 1 The Radicalization model
Modes of Maladaptation. Syrian refugees choice of adaptation mode depends on their gender, age, personality, self-control, religiosity and their ability to tolerate such sever strains. Refugees may choice a positive mode of adaptation and neutralizing their negative feelings and maximizing their religious beliefs and use self-justification to their surrounding situation and strains. Trying to find jobs and accept the consequences of the sever strains "as God' well). Others may choose maladaptive modes as a result of their low self-control, and negative feelings. Joining terrorist groups or radical groups or doing violent actions may be an example of such maladaptation techniques.

Radicalization. Radicalization can be seen as a cumulative micro—meso-macro pyscho-social process that may start on any level. On micro level, age, gender, education, personality traits such as low self-control all impact individual's radicalization. On meso level, with social institutions such as family, school, and other socialization agents also affect individual's radicalization. Finally on the macro level, culture and social values and norms play a critical role on preventing or enhancing individual' radicalization. This level is also connected with the global digital and virtual culture. Both affect individual being radicalized (Figure 1).

Determinants of youth general radicalization
Regression analysis reveals many determinants of Syrian refugees' general radicalization. Selected determinants of radicalization explained 30% of the variance on radicalization and were significant As can be seen from table 3 there is a significant impact of family size, unemployment, age, religiosity, low self-control, feelings and (anger and fear), victimization and violence on radicalization (F = 27.188 α = 0.000).

Table 3 ANOVA Table regressing selected independent variables on radicalization

Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	157483.377	9	17498.153	27.188	.000b
Residual	367495.942	571	643.601		
Total	524979.318	580			
Dependent Variable: Radicalization					

Table 4 Coefficients Table regressing selected independent variables on radicalization

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	51.662	16.063		3.216	.001
	LSC	2.138	.164	.472	13.008	**.000**
	Feelings	2.003	.649	.115	3.085	**.002**
	Feelings of	1.143	.412	.108	2.773	**.006**
	Religiosity	-1.548-	.551	-.109-	-2.809-	**.005**
	victim	.280	2.642	.004	.106	.916
	Violence	1.387	1.168	.043	1.188	.235
	Age	.810	.868	.037	.933	.351
	Unemployment	-2.023-	.756	-.097-	-2.677-	**.008**
	Family size	1.005	.528	.068	1.904	**.057**

However, unique contributions for each independent variable can be seen in Table 4. there is a significant impact of low self-control (t = 13.008 α = 0.000), feelings (t = 3.085 α = 0.002), feeling anger and fearful (t = 2.773 α = 0.006),religiosity (t = -2.809α = 0.005), unemployment (-2.677, α = 0.008) and family size(1.904, α = 0.0527).

DISCUSSION
Findings of the present study showed alarming percent of 46.7% prevalence of radical thoughts, beliefs and intentions among Syrian youth refugees in Jordan. Refugees intent to use force, violence, egocentrism, excluded others and intolerant behavor with others. Moreover, they believe in a raged religious ideology, forcible change, no respect for human rights or accept differences with others. Syrian youth refugees has encountered tremendous strains , fear and insecurity. Strains and fear has surrounded refugees inside Syria and in their journey crossing their national borders looking for safe haven. Internal threats posed by their national army, militant groups, terrorist groups, (i.e., ISIS, Lebanonian Hezbollah) and radical groups. Such strains put them more vulnerable to be recruited by terrorists groups. Refugees are dislocated from their towns, homes, love ones, friends, social ties, daily routines, lifestyles, and support networks, they must secure alternative shelter, food, security, safety, protection, and income for themselves and their families. With limited resources or just access to viable employment, young women may drop out of school, marry young, accept low-paid jobs, or take on risky work, such as prostitution. Accordingly, armed conflicts place significant stress on men, women and children. Repeated traumatic experiences (direct or indirect), feelings of insecurity and instability, scarce resources, displacement, loss of income, uncertainty about the future, and death or disability of a close friend or family member, all serve to tax individuals' coping mechanisms (Usta, Masterson, &Farver, 2016). Skjelsbaek (2001) All types of violence   increases among refugees when there is an increase in the level of frustration which is often inflicted on weaker individuals. In general, refugees experienced challenges related to disruption in their social networks, disputes over resources, high rate of unemployment, and increased level of criminal activities (Dako-Gyeke and Adu (2017).

Both the opportunity and the motive perspectives may apply to explain the radicalization among youth refugees. According to opportunity and the motive perspectives the economic, political and social structural features explain individuals joining a rebel or (*radical*) terrorist organization or not. The opportunity perspective (the greed perspective) focuses on structural conditions that provide opportu nities for a rebel or (*violent radicals*) group to wage war against a government (Collier, 2000; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).

Syrian refugees has lived an identity-based killing (killing people based on who they are or belong religiously or politically). This make refugees feel high grievance in this world, this includes feeling of unfair and injustice. Refugees fear the use of violence against women (especially rape), a situation most frequent occurred to women internally and externally during conflict and war times. With the high social value and taboo about honor of the women which represent the family honer and threated by rape.   Rape is not only a sexual or violent act; it is viewed as act of humiliation and revenge between conflicting parties. It has a negative social consequences as stigma and affects all members of family and relatives of the raped woman. Other consequences are the revenge from the perpetrator and the victim at the same time (what is called honor killing). According to the opportunity perspective, rebellion is feasible only when the potential gain from

joining a rebel or terrorist organization is so high and the expected costs so low that certain individuals will favor joining over alternative income-earning opportunities (Urdal, 2012). Refugees are forced to choose negative alternatives, the choice is motivated by the need for protection of the life of people in exchange of being recruited by a militant or terrorist group for at least minimal security and safety. Such a group becomes a reference group in security and mobility. Syrian refugees lack human security (free of need and free of fear), actually they live in need and fear. Association with militant group, terrorist group or radical group becomes a priority in such situation for safety, security and protection as well as a reference group that others will think twice before harming other powerful groups fearing their reaction and revenge.

Motives for joining terrorists and radical groups as well as committing political violence can be economic, like poverty, economic recession or inequality, or political, like lack of democracy, absence of minority representation or self-governance. (e.g. Goldstone, 2001, Urdal, 2012). Refugees who flee persecution or violence may experience threats to their security on a daily basis, but when the connection between security and migration is highlighted by the media or politicians, refugees themselves are usually characterized as posing a security threat to the receiving states and their citizens. This viewpoint is as likely to be expressed in the developing world as it is in the industrialized democracies. Most governments today perceive migration and refugee movements as a threat to their national interests (Loescher,2002).

The question becomes, does these strains push refugees toward radicalization?, and does it create a negative feelings toward the outside world? This study found a positive relationship between negative feelings and low self-control, general strains, religiosity, victims of violence, perpetrator of violence. Moreover, A significant positive relationship was found between radicalization and general stains, unemployment, victims of violence, perpetrator of violence and low self-control. For General Strain theory, strain is more likely to lead to crime and delinquency if it is perceived as unjust, of high magnitude, is associated with weak social bonds, and creates incentive to *engage in criminal coping. Such strains cause negative emotions favorable to engage in radical and militant groups, and be recruited to such groups. Reduce the perceived cost of militant, radical and terrorist groups, It provides them security, protection and operates as reference group.* Perceiving a strain as unjust or undeserved is more likely to lead to anger, irritability, and low constraint, which should increase the likelihood of aggressive types of crime (Agnew, 2001). Then it is expected that some refuges may choose maladaptive strategy in react to their strain, and develop a negative emotions while others may choose to adapt positively (religious adaptation) to their strain.

A positive relationship was found between **general strains** and low self-control, unemployment and negative feelings. This consists with the argument of Usta and Singh, (2015) who argue that an increase in intimate partner violence during wars and civil conflicts is not a new phenomenon but rather an extension of power asymmetry that underlies pre-existing gender inequalities in many societies (Nikolic-Ristanovic, 2000; Stark & Wessels, 2012). Youth refugees with high low self-control and who confronted high strains found more radicals. This psychological trait consisted with radicalization as a construct in its essence composed of a ruthless, imprudent, and violent behavior.Findings can be interpreted in the light of the General Theory of Crime (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990), Heise's Ecological model (1998), Greed theory (Collier, 2000; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004) and Grievance theory (Gurr, 1970).   All these theories focus on the structural macro forces that push refugees to be radical. It is clear that push factors have more impact and strength on youth radicalization. The push-factors involve but not limited to: social, political and economic grievances; a sense of injustice and discrimination; personal crisis and tragedies; frustration; alienation; a fascination with violence; searching for answers to the meaning of life; an identity crisis; social exclusion; alienation; marginalization; disappointment with democratic processes; polarization, etc. Wherethe pull-factors include but not limited to also, are a personal quest, a sense of belonging to a cause, ideology or social network; power and control; a sense of loyalty and commitment, etc.(Ranstorp, 2016, Al-Badayne, Al-Assasfeh, & Al-Bhri, 2016).

Empirical evidence supports the notion that general strains and macro forces such as failure of human development and absence of peace in

society produce radicalization and terrorism. Some studies on international terrorism found that economic development and social welfare policies are important determinants of terrorism(Li & Schaub, 2004).Berrebi (2007) points to a positive association between education and terrorism, while poverty is negatively associated with terrorism.

The refugees resorted to religion, spirituality, and income earning activities as their coping strategies. (Dako-Gyeke and Adu (2017).Refugees reported using a number of coping strategies across all phases, including: reliance on religious beliefs, cognitive strategies such as reframing the situation, relying on their inner resources, and focusing on future wishes and aspirations. Social support also emerged as a salient coping strategy (Khawaja, White, Schweitzer & Greenslade, 2008).

Refugees' victimization and violence lead to radicalization. Refugees are subject to direct and vicarious victimization. As the General Strain Theory specifies the kinds of strain, include "vicarious" strain, and "anticipated" strain (i.e., the expectation that current strains will continue or new ones will occur) most likely to lead to delinquency. As opposed to the types of stressors measured in most negative life events scales, vicarious victimization of close others is high in magnitude, likely to be seen as unjust, and occurs in situations with low social control (Agnew, 2002).

Generally, both the governments and the citizens of host countries view refugees negatively, associating them with problems of security, violence, and crime, and as a threat to social cohesion and employment. They are sometimes seen as posing a threat of insurgency or terrorism. In many regions, these negative perceptions have begun to generate a backlash against refugees—and especially, lately against Islamic groups. Given the regionalization of conflict and the domestic instability caused by both new and protracted refugee situations, the indirect security threats posed by refugee flows, if left unaddressed, are likely to have serious consequences for regional and global security (Loescher,2002).

The question then, what are the factors that affect Syrian refugees' radicalization. Analysis revealed There major group of factors that causes radicalization as the following: (1) Personal causes: age, Low self-control, violence, victimization, anger and fear (2). Family causes: Family size, and unemployment in the family (3). Societal and cultural causes: lack of feeling justice, equity, and pride. Heise's (1998) ecological model and Usta and Singh's (2015) theoretical framework may apply to the present study. Radicalization and terrorism can be a product of structural violence(patriarchy and degree of gender inequality, poverty level, breakdown of legal system, and displacement), community(access to weapons, and hosting/being hosted as a refugee), relationship(shift in gender roles, loss of social safety nets, and ethnic/religious differences), and individual(loss of income, insecurity, compromised psychological functioning, and coping mechanisms).

POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Social Implications
Refugees are marganilized, under sever strains and volurnable to varaities of critical risks and threats. They in high need and demand for peace and basic human need such as shlter, security and food. Services should be planned for a long term not for emergancy situation. Services providers should be fully aware of the psychological aspect of the refugees' situation, this include but not limited to: avoidance of stigmatization, shame, embarressment, sense of helplessness, humulitation, and other negative feelings towards refugees. Voulantary work should be based on human suffreing and services and aids shod be provided in a manner to protect refugeess' human rights, dignity and respect. They are victims and should not be blamed of being victims.

Regardless of the efforts of host countries and the international humanitarian community to ease the problem of refugees, the number of protracted refugee (those who have spent more than five years in exile without any immediate solution in view) situations has increased (Agblorti, 2011; Jacobsen, 2002, (Crisp, 2003). The international instruments accommodate countries to offer protection and basic human rights for refugees and people who migrate from their home countries to seek asylum on account of persecution that may be linked with race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion (UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR, 1993).International protection includes the assistance in processing refugees, provision of legal counsel, promotion of arrangements for the physical safety of refugees, assistance with voluntary repatriation, and support for refugees' resettlement (OHCHR, 1993).

Refugee crises is multi-faced problem, it has a personal, humanitarian, security, political, social and economic face. Men, women, and children are forced to flee their cities, homes, community, love ones, and livelihoods because of the fear to be victims of the political conflict, fighting parties, terrorist and militant groups and fear being victims to war. Moreover refugees are feared of being victims of humiliation, and women and children are feared of being sexually abused and their property being stolen and destroyed. In general they are squeezed between internal and external security threats. Forced migration has a humanitarian and security concerns that cause significant impact on national and international levels(Weiner, 1992; Lischer, 2005; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006; Crisp, 2000; Lischer, 2005). (Choi & Salehyan, 2013). Refugees can be victims and victimized and may spread conflict and instability to their host countries, particularly if hosts are under economic and security strains (Choi & Salehyan, 2013).

Security Implications
Most of the world's refugees remain in the developing world. The industrialized states, try to keep refugees away and sometimes to put obstacles not to receive them. Refugees do not abandon their homes unless they are faced with serious threats to their lives or liberty. Whether refugees find safe haven in the countries to which they flee depends in part on regional stability. Police and security forces arbitrarily harass, detain, and arrest refugees. Many refugees fear being attacked by agents from their home countries (Loescher,2002)
Refugees everyday feeling of insecurity, and the high perception that they may killed , torture, and the women may rapped in front of their family members, to humiliate and demean all family members as a way of revenge. Refugees can be victims of outsiders'' violence or by themselves as in the case of family violence can be within family during the displacement time as Usta and Singh, (2015) argue that an increase in IPV during wars and civil conflicts is an extension of power asymmetry that underlies pre-existing gender inequalities in many societies (Nikolic-Ristanovic, 2000; Stark & Wessels, 2012). Sustained exposure to violent acts during war and civil conflicts is associated with an elevated risk of both physical and sexual violence in families (Koenig et al., 2006), an altering of community-level norms about wife beating (Waldmann, 2007), and a tolerance for and acceptance of physical violence in how individuals solve simple problems. Accordingly, armed conflicts place significant stress on individuals. Repeated traumatic experiences (direct or indirect), feelings of insecurity and instability, scarce resources, displacement, loss of income, uncertainty about the future, and death or disability of a close friend or family member, all serve to tax individuals' coping mechanisms (Usta, Masterson, & Farver, 2016). Skjelsbaek (2001) argues that public violence increases among refugees when there is an increase in the level of frustration which is often inflicted on weaker individuals.

In recent years, both new and long established refugee populations have come to be viewed by local host governments as a threat to the internal order of the state, as well as a threat to regional, or even global, security. States perceive refugee groups as posing both direct and indirect security threats. The long-term presence of refugees can exacerbate existing tensions and heighten intercommunal conflict, particularly when a state has ethnic rifts of its own, a vulnerable economic or social infrastructure, or hostile neighbors. (Loescher,2002)

Several studies document the framing of refugees as potential terrorist threats by numerous states in legislative and policy responses (see Brouwer, 2002; Freilich, Opesso and Newman, 2006; Nezer, 2006). Adelman (2002: 5) characterizes this trend as the "overlap between refugee and security concerns". This overlap instigated changes in the way that asylum claims are handled, the number of asylum claims granted, and the detainment and exclusion of certain refugees on the basis of their region of origin, most notably from the Middle East and the South Asia (Andreas and Biersteker, 2003; Brouwer, 2002; Sidebotham, 2004; Welch and Schuster, 2005). For example, after the Terrorism Act of 2000, Muslim refugees in Britain are increasingly

being targeted as potential terrorist threats (Fekete, 2001; Collier, 2005; Nezer, 2006). On the contrary, some studies show no evidence for a direct relationship between forced migrants arriving in Europe and the risk of terrorism in the EU. For example, Howard (2010) contends that there is no causal link despite post-9/11 fears (see also Guild, 2003). (Choi & Salehyan, 2013)

Refugees also face severe economic and social insecurity in these countries of first asylum; their freedom of movement is severely restricted; they cannot integrate with local populations; they are given inadequate or no assistance; they are refused permission to work. For developing countries, displaced populations are both a consequence of conflict and a cause of continuing conflict and instability. Forced displacement can obstruct peace processes, undermine attempts at economicdevelopment, and exacerbate intercommoned tensions. The use of refugee camps by combatants draws refugee communities directly into cross-border conflicts and accelerates conflicts and tensions within host countries. In many host countries, governments prefer refugees to remain in camps and settlement areas close to the border of their home countries. Not only are the physical security and material safety of refugees not guaranteed in these remote areas, but the proximity of camps to countries of refugee origin also makes it easy for combatants to cross borders to engage in guerrilla warfare. (Loescher,2002)

One can identify two major categories of Jordanian security implic ations: **Jordan national security and syrian refugees' security.** Threats to Jordanian national security can be direct or indirect. Direct theats to Jordan security include but not limited to: terrorists groups, and syrian secret forces that both infiltrated between refugees for the purpose of doing aggressive actions to the refugees or to Jordan. Competion and high demand on public service-infrastructure by Jordanian citizens and refugees hasve created public movement and political stands aginsit the refugees in addition to the negative feeling towards refugees. More over competion on a limited job opportunityies also added more stains on the Jordanian citezens harsh economic situatuin. Security implications included all aspects of human secirity in additional to the traditional securtiy and formal securtity (police security and refugees saftey and security. Deficiences in fullfilling needs such as food, shelter, income, education, transportation, freedom, and human rights have secuity implications. The left parties (Albath party) in jordan who is loyal to the Assad regime pushing the public toward supporting Assad regime under the facke justification of Syrian unity and intergrity and avoiding any discussion in AlAssad war crimes aginst Syrian peopl. More over Syrian intelegence who play the role of refugees can threat regugees in several ways, including direct threat and taking their love ones in Syria and killing them, rape and impresion.

A public awareness campaign is needed to enhance citizen sympath with refugeees as victims of the regeme and to decrease any negative feelings towards the refugess by the Jordanian citizen. Religion worship houses can play important roles in encouraging people in helping refugees and in doing voluntary work. Social ties between Jordanians and Syrians has rooted for long time. Not all Syrian refugees are living in camps, a great persent are living in Jordan cities and working in Jordan. Moreover there are Jordanian citizens originlly from Syrian and others living in Jordan for long time. In addtiona many Jordanian has married from Syria, All thees factors have contributed to the changing demographic profile in Jordan, which impose a national security threat too. Adding to that the palestinian refugees in 1948 and 1967 who accounted fro about 50% of Jordan population. Most have fled situations of war or famine (Adams, Gardiner, & Assefi, 2004) in which they experienced significant trauma, including physical and psychological torture, sexual violence, shelling and other atrocities (Neuner, Schauer, Karunakara, Klaschik, Robert, & Elbert, 2004).

Jordan is not in its best time economically, socially and politically. Being in the heart of unrest area, with surrounding and very close unstable countries like Iraq, Syria and Egypt. At the same time involving in Yemen crises and Fighting against ISIS . Jordan is facing internal and external threats to its security. Syrian refugees as a political and humanitarian crises caries potential threats to the Jordanian national security. Fight against ISIS inside Syria is also poses internal and external threat to the national security taking into account around 4000 Jordanian youth fighting with ISIS and with hidden ISIS social incubators. Lack of international aids to Jordan complicated the government efforts to face such threats and provide

necessary humanitarian aids to the refugees. Internal multi-faces strains, lack of opportunities for job search, high unemployment among youth, high cost of living, lack of freedom and free media, and corruption all weakened the social fabric and national unity.

To sum up, Syrian Refugees is human tragedy multi-faced global problem. Refugees are victims of war crimes. Refugees in need of protecting their human rights. War criminals and political violence perpetrators to be blamed. Services to refugees should be provided with dignity and integrity and be planned for long term services. Syrian youth refugees will join the ISIS army and terrorists groups if they left without social immunization agonist radical thoughts and ideology, protection and empowerment. The people who go out and kill other people are young males between the ages of 16 and 30. (Huntington, 2001)

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