



PROCESS OF NATION BUILDING IN AFGHANISTAN.

Social Science

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ABSTRACT

The nation building in ever country for them identify is obligatory, for this it is necessary to be built in a proses, the nation building proses in Afghanistan is depend on nations and religions. The nations and religious are mostly pushed the nation building to a tragedy which doesn't promote that much as it expected. But this proses in Afghanistan face with a lot of problems and the all nations of Afghanistan are called afghan, so in this research problems, promotion and the current situation is studied.

KEYWORDS

Nation-Building in Practice, Nation building in Afghanistan.

INTRODUCTION

Afghanistan is officially the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, is a landlocked country located within South Asia and Central Asia. Afghanistan is bordered by Pakistan in the south and east; Iran in the west; Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan in the north; and in the far northeast, China. Its territory covers 652,000 square kilometers (252,000 sq. mi). Kabul serves as the capital and its largest city.

The political history of the modern state of Afghanistan began with the Hotak and Durrani's dynasties in the 18th century. In the late 19th century, Afghanistan became a buffer state in the "Great Game" between British India and the Russian Empire. Its border with British India, the Durand Line, was formed in 1893 but it is not recognized by the Afghan government and it has led to strained relations with Pakistan since the latter's independence in 1947. Following the Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919 the country was free of foreign influence, eventually becoming a monarchy under King Amanullah, and later for 40 years under Zahir Shah. In the late 1970s, Afghanistan in a series of coups first became a socialist state and then a Soviet Union protectorate. This evoked the Warn in 1980s against rebels. By 1996 most of Afghanistan was captured by the fundamentalist Islamic group the Taliban, who ruled most of the country as a totalitarian regime for almost five years. The Taliban were forcibly removed by the NATO-led coalition, and a new democratically-elected government political structure was formed.

Afghanistan is a unitary presidential Islamic republic with a population of 35 million, mostly composed of ethnic Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazara and Uzbeks.

The idea behind this research is deeply rooted in two things: firstly, in my personal interest for an explanation of this matter because of being part of that system and secondly,

To elevate my educational grad so it need publishes my research in international journal.

The Afghanistan we know today is simply a product of long term living in this part of region. To give shape to this project it is also essential to have a little knowledge of what is actually meant by nation, nationalism and nation building and what they mean as a concept.

General concept of Nation and Nationalism

Everything must have its origins or roots in something different than itself, or every sensible reality must have been caused. This brings us to the question of, what caused nation and nationalism? Hence, before coming to conclusion on what is nation and nationalism, for the sake of a better understanding a trip through the historical development of both concepts is importance.

Nation

A nation is a stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, ethnicity or psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.

The notions nation and nationalism are mutually interdependent. That is to say, one cannot define them independently for the simple reason of disability to point, which is the cause of the other. Scholars have come

to agree that; the nation should be defined in term of principles, which have defined nationalism itself. According to Gellner, nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent". Within this principle nationalism is best defined in terms of sentiment or a movement he argues, whereas the first holds "the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment.

In the above formulation, it has become apparent that, the discussion of nationalism involves political and ethnical boundaries. In other words when one speaks of nationalism, he is bound to speak in terms of states and nations. In doing so, nationalism is defined as a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and, in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state a contingency already formally excluded by the principle in its general formulation should not separate the power holders from the rest. Here it will not be act of place to define state because most of the time people assume state and nation to be same and use them interchangeably which actually is not true.

Nation-Building

Nation building is constructing or structuring a national identity using the power of the state.

Paradoxically, a degree of consensus in regard to what nation-building requires stands in stark contrast to the uncertainty surrounding the term itself. Chesterman correctly notes that 'the term "nation-building" is a broad, vague, and often pejorative one'. It is frequently used interchangeably with other phrases such as 'state-building', 'peace-building' and 'stabilization and reconstruction operations'. In particular, nation-building is often conflated with state building, and simply means the enhancement of a state's capacities, with or without external intervention. For this reason, Chesterman prefers 'state-building' as the more accurate term for those activities usually brought under the rubric of nation-building: 'The focus here is on the state (that is, the highest institutions of governance in a territory) rather than the nation (a people who share common customs, origins, history, and frequently language)'. It is thus helpful to reconsider the origins of 'nation-building' and the historical milieu out of which it emerged, in order to untangle these various strands of its usage.

The contemporary notion of nation-building can be traced back to the decades after the Second World War. Although there had been earlier restatements of the term to describe, for example, the political projects of elites in nineteenth century Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States, which sought to make political boundaries matching with cultural identity while modernizing and integrating the political economy of these new national states. It was global political developments after the Second World War that brought 'nation-building' into the lexicon of both academics and popular audiences. The immediate source of this development had two key aspects.

The first of these was the decolonization of vast areas of Africa and Asia, which presented newly independent states with a number of key problems to which nation-building was thought to be a solution. Among other things, these problems included the lack of a unifying national identity, economic under development, the fragility of political and social institutions, and the questionable legitimacy of

state power. Needless to say, the specific solutions pursued for each of these problems in different national states were highly variable.

But irrespective of this variability, such solutions were often understood under the rubric of nation building, which became largely synonymous with development and modernization. Importantly, nation building was here understood as largely an endogenous process, even if external powers could assist in its promotion.

The second post war development to which the vocabulary of nation building was a response to the US military occupation of Japan and Germany. The defeated axis powers had suffered tremendous physical destruction, while the political regimes that had led them into war had been decapitated. In a context of rapidly escalating bipolar competition with the Soviet Union, the United States sought to rebuild the shattered economies of the axis powers, and to establish liberal democratic constitutional orders that would be bulwarks against Soviet style communism. This was accomplished through both direct military occupation and political intervention, in addition to a massive injection of restorative financial aid under the auspices (in Europe) of the Marshall Plan. The subsequent economic recovery and relative political stability of the old axis powers, now firmly in the US Cold War camp, would later be presented as exemplary instances of nation-building, and models for what could be accomplished through external intervention into post conflict zones such as Afghanistan. Such views typically ignore the obvious differences between these cases: namely, that Germany, Japan and Italy despite massive physical damage and loss of life during the war had highly educated and literate populations, histories of modern political institutions with sophisticated bureaucracies, and technologically advanced, industrialized economies that could be readily rebuilt given the capital and political will. They also had populations with shared language and national identities, despite regional differences. This stood in stark contrast to countries like Afghanistan, with its many ethnic and linguistic divisions, which could and frequently did become the basis for political mobilization and division.

These two sources out of which emerged a theory and practice of nation building the post-colonial state on the one hand and post-war occupation and reconstruction on the other are important because they contain within them the seeds of difference, or at least difference of emphases, that would be ignored by later theorists and commentators. The difference is twofold. On the one hand, nation-building arising from the post-colonial experience is, in essence, an endogenous process. External actors, including other states, may assist and/or encourage nation-building in various ways, but it is understood to be a project pursued by the local population and state. Nation-building in the post-war axis states, by contrast, was exogenous because it represented projects in which US military occupation, political intervention and massive economic aid was absolutely essential. On the other hand, while nation-building arising from both sources involved the building of state capacities (perhaps more accurately labelled 'state-building', as Chesterman would insist), post-colonial nation-building was also concerned with the forging of a common identity and hence loyalty to the new state. This typically involved programs of mass education in a common language, as well as the propagation of a nationalist spirit through state media, flags, anthems, national holidays, memorials and the like. As well as state capacities, what was being 'built' here was very much a 'nation' in the strict sociological sense a named population sharing a contiguous territory and a common language and identity. Subsequent US nation-building efforts in Vietnam, Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, have involved varying degrees of both state and nation-building, although nation-building has been the more common vernacular used to describe these projects.

More recently in Afghanistan and Iraq, nation-building has often been rebadged under the label 'Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations'. Criticism towards nation-building was so severe towards the end of the second term of the Bush Administration that the US government decided to rebrand its ongoing activities in Afghanistan and Iraq as Stabilization and reconstruction operations. The United States Institute of Peace asserts that the goal of Stabilization and reconstruction operations was the creation of a safe and secure environment through the rule of law, stable governance and sustainable development. The US military, especially, became enamored with the term, using it in conjunction with counter-insurgency. The change in classification was considered by some to

signify 'a dramatic shift in thinking . . . from an exclusively humanitarian to a more complicated humanitarian/security perspective', thus presenting 'a more realistic conception of what was required'. More realistically the change in language was due to the perceived failures of 'nation-building' in the two countries. Beneath the rhetoric of a 'dramatic shift in thinking', Stabilization and reconstruction operations remained a synonym for nation-building. One member of a War Crimes Commission Hearing observed that the use of the phrase Stabilization and reconstruction operation 'strikes me as nation-building' and was utilized because 'we don't want to deal with the reality that we're into nation-building . . . We don't describe it that way, but that's what we're doing'. With this in mind, it seems that in the public realm the only concrete differences between the terms nation-building, state-building, peace-building and Stabilization and reconstruction operations are who applies the term and who has the power to make their definition stick.

So where does this discussion leave us in terms of how nation-building is to be understood in this study? First, although what is often referred to as nation-building is simply the enhancement of state capacities, it is not only that. It also involves efforts to forge more cohesive national identities and loyalty to the new state, most frequently through mass education and state-sponsored propaganda campaigns, which may or may not have external support. Thus, contra Chesterman, this study employs the more encompassing 'nation-building' instead of 'state-building'. Second, whether it is principally promoted by internal or external actors, nation-building involves efforts to build country-wide material and institutional infrastructure, such that the administrative reach and political authority of the state is enhanced. Third, such projects are often pursued in the wake of armed conflict and civil strife that have severed the nexus between society and state. Finally, we can distinguish between endogenous and exogenous nation-building. The latter is principally driven by external actors who intervene directly in a state or failed state, and then embark on those state- and nation-building activities.

It is this exogenous or externally sponsored nation-building that is our principal focus here.

As such, the following definition of (externally sponsored) nation-building is used: nation-building is a set of processes through which a foreign power or powers, by direct intervention and in collaboration with favored domestic political elites, seeks to promote a particular political identity and erect or re-erect a country-wide institutional and material infrastructure that can become the enduring foundation of political stability after a period of armed conflict and civil strife. But if this is what nation-building means, what concrete activities should it involve? On this there has been more agreement in the literature than there typically has been with respect to terminology.

Nation-Building in Practice

There is some agreement on what nation-building requires and what it involves. Firstly, it requires a lengthy commitment in terms of time, typically years or even decades rather than months. Secondly, with this long-term temporal commitment also comes a significant commitment of human, financial and other resources. Thirdly, each nation-building situation is unique. There are no strict criteria that can be abstractly applied to each case. Policy, therefore, must be shaped and adjusted to suit the concrete situation. That said, there are some general areas of agreement as to what effective nation-building demands.

In post-conflict situations nation-builders must navigate a complex and volatile environment that includes displaced persons, ethnic, tribal and religious rivalry, crime, corruption, disease, malnutrition, and humanitarian abuses. Humanitarian assistance is the most pressing initial concern. The provision of shelter, food, clothing and medical services saves lives, assists refugees and relieves suffering. Once the humanitarian situation is under control, the more difficult issues of governance, security, law and development can be prioritized. Here the promotion of effective governance is essential. A transitional authority is the first step, but in the longer term international actors must facilitate the creation of an effective and viable system of governance. Perhaps the most difficult problem here concerns representation – who will be represented at the helm of the refurbished ship of state, and how will that representation be determined? Some scholars contend that, as far as is feasible, all political factions in society should be represented in the new governing institutions. In this view, international agents must avoid creating 'closed societies and structures of power', through

the exclusion of certain groups from the political process. The difficulty is, however, that the empowerment of some persons and factions can have a longer-term destabilizing impact on governance.

Culture is also an important consideration for the establishment of a new political order. Nation-builders must account for the traditions, or a plurality of traditions, that have shaped the culture of the target country. According to Somite and Peterson, there should be an 'appreciation of the culture of the target country, and avoidance of arrogance, or seeming to denigrate the institutions and values of the people'. But conversely, would be nation-builders also need to be sensitive to the ways in which local culture can impede their efforts. In much the same way that agency culture can form a barrier to coherent US foreign policy, the cultural traditions of a country can prevent the introduction of what from the standpoint of the nation-builders seem like rational changes. Effective means need to be identified and developed that can help overcome these impediments without offending local cultural sensibilities. In order for governance to be effective, there must be a stable security environment. Nation-building aims, therefore, to facilitate a transition from a 'state of internal convulsion to a settled civic order', and to achieve 'a self-sustaining peace'.

Finally, the success of nation-building can stand or fall on what is often described as 'development'. This incorporates economics, health, education, agriculture, electricity, transport and other infrastructure projects. Economic assistance, for example, seeks to expedite economic recovery to produce a self-sustaining economic system. The key issues in economic development are, in the first instance, currency stabilization, realigning revenue and expenditure, controlling inflation, capacity building and establishing accountability and combating corruption. Education, meanwhile, provides a means to forge greater national unity and instill faith in the principles of law, governance and human rights. It also facilitates the production of skilled graduates, and can help ease ethnic and religious tensions. In respect of all development projects, Fukuyama argues that domestic actors must be empowered. We should be arriving with resources to motivate the natives to design their own factory and to help them figure out how to build and operate it themselves. Thus development projects should utilize techniques that persuade the domestic populace to embrace the nation-building process.

Each aspect of nation-building is interconnected and interdependent. Economic and political growth is mutually reinforcing and a functioning government will help to ensure the efficiency of development projects. Development projects, in turn, may promote a higher standard of living and create economic opportunities. Yet all of these efforts rely on a secure and stable environment. An ad hoc approach that neglects any of these dimensions encourages fragmentation, duplication and, ultimately, failure. Paris argues that the inability of would-be nation-builders to reach common objectives is a complex, multifarious problem. Different conceptions, goals and interests manifest within countries; between civilian and military factions; between governments and NGOs; and also within the UN system 'where bureaucratic rivalries and turf battles are legion'. To more fully appreciate how such challenges were met or not met in Afghanistan after 2001, it is necessary to briefly outline something of the history of that war-torn country.

Nation building in Afghanistan

The question of state and nation building is with no doubt one of the most complex questions in the history of political science. But the case of a multicultural and diversified country like Afghanistan brings it into a yet deeper complexity. Social scientists from abroad have in most cases approached Afghanistan as a unified country with a nation called Afghans in 2003 constitutional law in article 2 mentioned that afghan is an official identity for all nation . Afghanistan with its artificial borders is as elusive as is its nation. On these bases and for the sake of a wider, clarifying and most possible objective picture of the course of nationalism in Afghanistan, a historical overview of at least the "modern" Afghanistan is necessary.

By the modern Afghanistan is meant the emergence of Afghanistan and the very first efforts towards a centralized government, which went side by side with the rise and development of post industrialism and nationalism elsewhere.

Nation building can be discussed as.

- Ethnic diversity and social organizations

- The first attempts to form an Afghan state
- The European imperialism and its impact
- The modernization movements
- The rise and fall of Nationalism

Ethnic Diversity and social organization

In contrast to what so far has been presented by different western historians, Afghanistan is the land of the Afghans. As Gregorian argues, "nowhere is the difficult legacy of Afghanistan more sharply revealed than in her ethnic mosaic and socioeconomic structure. Linguistic, racial, cultural, and religious diversities, coupled with the country's predominantly semi feudal, tribal, and nomadic organization, presented great obstacles to the development of a modern state".

Afghanistan counts more than 53 different ethnic groups. Within this there are four principal ethnic groups who have shaped at least the modern history of Afghanistan. These are the Pashtun's, the Tajik's, the Uzbek's and the Hazara's.

1. The Pashtun

The Pashtun who form 38 -50% of the total population are the largest ethnic group of the country. Pashtun are also known as Pathans, which is the Indianized form of Pashtun, Pushtuneh and Pushtuneh. There is theory, which traces "Afghans to Aryan peoples.

In contrast to other ethnic groups in Afghanistan, Pashtun are dominated group.

2. The Tajiks

Even though there has not been a census in Afghanistan the Tajiks form 25 -26 % of the total population, and thereby the second largest ethnic group. They have Dari as language.

3. The Hazara's

Hazara's, who are believed to be the third largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, form 12-19% of the population.

4. The Uzbeks

Amongst the Turkic minorities in Afghanistan, "the Uzbeks are the largest Turkic speaking group". They form an estimated 6 -8 % of the population.

There are of course other minorities who also deserve notice, but not necessarily for the aim of this paper. Therefore, with this very basic and simplified overview of the ethnical diversity, we turn to the other divisive forces, that of the organization and social structure the estimation of nation in Afghanistan which mentioned is not testify.

Religious diversity

Religious diversity is not as crucial as an ethnical or lingual cleavages, but because it was an obstacle for both Sunni and Shi'a Muslims to merge and to form a homogenous culture or social institutions, a short notice is of no harm. Scholars believe that almost up to 99 per cent of the present day Afghan population professes Islam. There are two branches of Islam, the Sunni's who followers of the Hanafi school of Islam are and there are Shi'a's. There are no precise figures on the ratio of Sunni to Shi'a Muslims, but there are indications that the Sunni majority probably does not exceed 75- 80 per cent of the total population.

However the difference between these two communities, the Sunni and the Shi'a, "were a major problem for those who wanted to build a modern Afghan state", because both communities failed to build a homogenous culture and shared institutions or a common social force.

In other words, religion could not really serve as a shared social force or institution to unite different ethnic groups. Different ethnic groups had their own local customs. As for the Afghan tribes, for example, the Islamic law had to coexist with their local tribal code or the Pashtunwali.

Islam however was an important element of the late afghan nationalism and of efforts of unification. But both, the Afghan monarchy and the Afghan nationalist failed to make that happen. Besides religion another institution, which is of great importance for the rise and failure of nationalism in Afghanistan, is the Afghan tribalism.

The Afghan Tribalism

Tribal structure influences the political structure always in Afghanistan.

Many sub tribes surround the main core of every tribe. The sub tribes again are divided into various family units or clans. Within a tribe the families choose a chief, the so called Malik, meaning the land possessor. The Malik on his turn elects the Khan, who is the leader of the tribe. Among the tribes whose feudal relations were highly developed, the eldest son customarily succeeded his father, law is very flexible with tribal issues, because tribal structure is very powerful in Afghanistan, and tribal structure is very useful for defending the foreign invaders.

The Pushtunwali

Pushtunwali is another institution which help the rule of law, always supporting security in the village by Pashtunwali law.

Pushtunwali, particularly the concept of nang-i- Pukhtun or nang i Pukhtana (Pathan honor), which embodied the principle of equity and badal, or revenge at all costs. Pashtunwali is supporting all poor and weak people from the powerful and rich people brutal actions, give the rights of widows, orphan and other weak people of society by Pashtunwali where government is not to implement its rule of law.

The Customary law

Rawaj or Rawaj e am, which means customary law is another institution that resisted the process of political and socio economic integration. There were a variety of Rawaj, which differed from tribe to tribe and from region to region. This customary laws were so deeply rooted that, it often not only circumvented the laws of the kingdom but also modified certain tenets of Islamic law, especially in matters of marriage, inheritance, and woman's rights.

In sum, besides the religion as social institution there are three other institutions; The Afghan tribalism, the Pushtunwali and the Rawaj or customary law.

With a basic knowledge of the ethnic diversity and the social structure and institutions, in what follows, the first attempts towards the formation of an Afghan state will be discussed. Within this debate the role of the British imperialism and the impact of its foreign policy are indispensable element which will be discussed consequently.

The first attempts to form an Afghan state

Mir Wais Hotak of the Ghilzai tribe who in 1707 made the first attempt to establish an autonomous Afghan state in the province of Kandahar.

In the year 1709 Mir Wais Khan Hotak a successful revolt against the Persian Empire and assumed power in the city and province of Kandahar, thus providing a base for the nucleus of an Afghan state.

The weakness and inability of Persia to reassert her sovereignty and on the other hand the success of Ghilzai revolt encouraged other Afghan as well to revolt. And so in 1716 they captured and conquered the city of Herat.

In the year 1722 the Ghilzai power reached its highest stage, when the Ghilzai forces defeated the Persian armies and conquered Isfahan, the Safawi capital.

What is interesting and relevant for the purpose of the paper, is the European imperialism on the one hand and the rise of Abdul Rahman or the Iron Amir on the other, or in other words the first attempts towards a centralized Afghanistan in the modern sense. For, it is the Ages of Imperialism and Industrialism in which borders were drawn and the idea of nationalism flourished. Therefore, before coming to the rise of Abdul Rahman and his role in the formation of the modern Afghanistan, firstly the role and impact of European imperialism will be discussed.

Afghanistan From anarchy to absolute monarchy

Many historians believe that the first major and concentrated attempt to reform Afghanistan began in 1880 when Amir Abdul Rahman Khan, ascended the Afghan Throne. The new Amir however was left with a country weakened by wars and foreign interventions and occupations and internal strife. There was a total anarchy. The Amir himself described the situation as: Every priest, mullah and chief of every tribe

and village considered himself an independent King, and for about 200 years past, the freedom and independence of many of these priests were never broken by their sovereigns. The Mirs of Turkestan, the chiefs of Ghilzai were all stronger than their Amirs.

Due to above described structures the power of the Afghan central government was very limited. In order to construct a strong central government, the first challenge the new Amir was facing was, to break the feudal and tribal structures, but how and where to start? The new Amir was aware of the importance of religion. Therefore, he ascribed a divine sanction and purpose to his rule. As god wished to relieve Afghanistan from foreign aggression and internal disturbances, he honored this, his humble servant, by placing him in this responsible position, and he caused him to become absorbed in thoughts of the welfare of the nation and inspired him to be devoted to the progress of this people... for the welfare and true faith of the Holy Prophet Mohamed. What Amir did was in effect two things, firstly he provided a religious justification for the monarchy and secondly he invoked the concept of the divine rule of the King. But he had still a long path to walk.

A. Breaking the tribal power and system

As Amir himself mentioned, the Mirs and tribal chieftains had been stronger than their sovereigns in the past 200 years. In other words the first steps towards a centralized and authoritative regime was to break the tribal resistance to legitimate his rule. What he did, was beyond sheer sentimental appeals. In order to overcome the tribal resistance "force" bloody reprisals, matrimonial alliances, bribes, and intrigues were all used in his battle". Besides the political and the coercive means, he also used his own marriages and those of his sons to tighten his ties with tribal chieftains, religious leaders, and important members of non-Pashtun ethnic groups.

Within this fight, religion was an important and effective weapon. Religious injunctions were used against any revolting tribe, leader or feudal lord. They were branded as traitors and outlaws. In the "struggle with the powerful Shi'a Hazara in 1888", he used for example, the orthodoxy and fanaticism of the Sunni Muslims, a move that secured him thousands of these policies were largely successful, he succeeded to unify Afghanistan politically.

B. The administrative reforms

Two things drove Abdul Rahman. Firstly unifying Afghanistan at any cost and at the same time constituting administrative changes and social, political and economic reforms. In order to do so he was to form a constitutional government. He established a general consultative assembly made up of three consultative categories of representatives: Sardars (aristocrats), Khawanin mulki (commoners), and Mullahs (religious representatives).

Amir however, had no intentions of truly sharing his power and the selection of members of this assembly who had no executive or legislative power, were subject to Amir's approval. The only function of this assembly, aside from symbolizing and promoting the concept of unity under the monarchy was to serve in a consultative capacity to help the Amir Gather war supplies and advise him in various state activities. Amir, however, also established another executive body as supreme council, but it was equally powerless. Not only was there no office equivalent to that of prime minister; the council could not give advice to the monarch unless he requested it to do so. Its only function was to execute the will of the Amir.

The mission for the political absolutism, unification of the country and the administrative reorganization of the country, led the Amir into a struggle with the religious establishment. By whatever means, either through peaceful or coercive it was essential for the Amir to gain their support. Therefore, he again used religion as a means to win the hearts of the people. As he did with the Hazara revolt of 1888, in 1896 he conquered Kafaristan (what is now called Nooristan) and converted its inhabitants to Islam. This way he strengthened his position with respect to religious establishment.

C. Legal and social reforms

In order to get a better and further grip and control over the kingdom, Abdul Rahman Khan divided the existing laws of his kingdom into three categories: Shari'a or the proper Islamic law, Qanoon or the administrative or civil law, and the tribal laws. He established also three types of courts: Religious courts, which dealt with religious and

civil affairs, criminal courts, which were administered by the chief of police (kotwals) and judges, and a board of commerce, which was made up of merchants Afghan and non-Afghan, Hindu as well as Muslim, which settled business disputes.

Another effort of Amir Abdul Rahman was the attempt to abolish the long standing customary law, which in violation of Islamic law bound a wife not only to her husband but to his entire family as well, widows who wanted to remarry had to marry their husbands' next kin, often against their will. Another reform that the Amir brought was the abolition of slavery.

D. Political reforms

The political reform of Abdul Rahman and their consequences were essential to the process of nation building in Afghanistan, in particular his isolationist position towards the use of European technology to modernize country.

At the end of the nineteenth century there were many European plans to connect Afghanistan into the international railway system. The plan was to connect Paris (and Calais) with Calcutta, via Orenburg, Tashkent, Balkh, and Peshawar. The plans however were not carried out due to political tensions between Russia and Britain. But even if there had been an agreement between those two powers, Abdul Rahman wouldn't have allowed it. Because he, firmly resisted all efforts to introduce railways into Afghanistan. In this, he acted against the advice of some of his own advisers as well as the British government in India, who argued that Afghanistan could not fully exploit its natural resources or market its products unless modern means of transportations, production and communication were available. But that was not enough to convince the Amir of the importance of the modern means of transportation and communication. For he believed that technological advances and especially the introduction of railways would make Afghanistan vulnerable and accessible to the foreign powers. In his own words: I again advise my sons and successors not to listen to these people. I know what they say is quite true, but, at the same time, they do not consider that by making the country easily accessible, foreign powers would not find so much difficulty in entering and spreading themselves over our country. The greatest safety of Afghanistan lies in its natural impregnable position.

Abdul Rahman had his reasons to believe so. He was not all the way against the introduction of railways and modern means of transportation and communication, but Afghanistan was not ready yet, he felt. The first and foremost priority of Afghanistan he claimed was to build an army that was able to defend Afghanistan against the foreign invaders. Once that was realized, the process of modernization would follow automatically. It was this desire, to build a strong and independent Afghanistan, which did and does dominate politics in Afghanistan. The economic and political policies of Abdul Rahman were mostly determined by a constant fear of European imperialism. The Amir rejected any reform that was not in the interest of the monarchy. As he always claimed, reform and modernization were only the means, independence, under an absolute monarch, the end.

Another element, which deeply affected and still does the politics of Afghanistan, is the so-called Durand line. In 1893, caught between two powers, the Russian pressure on the one hand and the British intransigence on the other, Abdul Rahman signed the Durand agreement with the British. In this pact which increased his subsidy from 80, 000 to 120, 000 pounds, the Amir renounced Afghanistan's right to intervene in tribal belt. The Durand agreement shaped the politics of Afghanistan in many serious ways.

The reign of Abdul Rahman, with his death, ended in 1901. The end of Amir Abdul Rahman was not particularly the end of the desire to form a unified and independent Afghanistan. His successor and son Habibullah Khan continued to walk the same path, though facing new challenges and political difficulties. The rise of Habibullah Khan gave birth to the first movements towards limited modernization, enlightenment and nationalism in a national sense.

2.9 The rise of modernism and Afghan "Nationalism"

Amir Abdul Rahman had exiled many of his political opponents. Amongst these was Sardar Ghulam Muhammad Khan Tarzi, the Father of Mahmud Tarzi, a young, learned and ambitious young man, who was charged with conspiracy against the state. When Habibullah Khan,

successor of Amir Abdul Rahman ascended the throne, he forgiven his father's political opponents and allowed them to come back. With the death of both Amir Abdul Rahman Khan and Sardar Ghulam Muhammad Khan, the Tarzi family decided to return to Afghanistan. After a brief stay in Karachi, the Tarzis went to Damascus, where Sultan Abdul Hamid II, the Ottoman Emperor, allowed them to establish residence. The twenty years of exile were of great importance for the young Tarzi. In the schools of Damascus and Constantinople he did not only come in contact with the European cultures and institutions, but he was also exposed to the Ottoman nationalist revivalist movement and the Pan Islamic views of al-Afghani.

Furthermore, serving in the secretariat of the Ottoman provincial administration he gained also administrative experience abroad. His eventual return to Afghanistan meant two things: the rise of both modernist and a nationalist movement.

Immediately after his arrival, Tarzi made a first efforts to initiate a programme of reform in Afghanistan, calling for Amir's attention to the seriousness of problems in the educational, communication and industrial system, as well as pointing the undesirable effects of the political, cultural and intellectual isolation.

At first, the new Amir appointed Tarzi as the chief of the Bureau of Translation. Tarzi's main task was to inform Amir about changes and events in the Islamic world and Europe. Consequently, after many untiring efforts of Tarzi and Inayatullah Khan, the eldest son of Amir Habibullah who supervised the educational administration, Tarzi succeeded to introduce the first newspaper in Afghanistan, the Siraj al Akhbar, meaning the Lamp of the News.

Siraj al Akhbar was also working for the Afghan nationalism. Tarzi convince Habibullah that a socioeconomic transformation of Afghanistan would not invite foreign intervention and domination or jeopardize the monarchy and its ruling dynasty. Worth mentioning with this process is the clashing ideas of young intellectual Afghans and that of the religious establishment, and their efforts to persuade the religious leaders of the compatibility of Islam with modernity.

Tarzi and his associates rejected the view of those who argued that the backwardness of the Islamic societies had its roots in the religion itself. Instead they believed, a planned modernization would not contradict Islamic values and therefore, we should not only look into these limited European culture exports, which were designed exclusively for European colonies. According to Tarzi, the main cause of Afghanistan's backwardness was on the one hand the disunity and on the other the isolationist position of country, which had led to a cultural and intellectual isolationism.

Along with all these, Tarzi repeatedly emphasized the importance of the contact with the outside world and other culture. From his perspective this was the first concrete and essential step towards Social reform and transformation. To this end he used Siraj al Akhbar to bridge the gap between Afghanistan and the rest of the world. He did this to firstly, inform young Afghan intellectual of the scientific and technological achievement of the West and secondly, to advance their understanding of the western institutions.

To fight illiteracy, to emphasize the importance of education and to motivate the youngsters towards education, Tarzi came up with Siraj al Atfal or the Light of Children. In this newspaper, he published stories, moralistic and didactic tales riddles and puzzles, all designed to impress the Afghan youngsters, about the importance of education. In order to generate popular interest in science and learning, he translated many works from the English, Turkish and Arabic literature, amongst which prominent are; Around the World in Eighty Days, Twenty Thousand leagues Under the Sea, The Mysterious Island and International law and a five volume of History of the Russo-Japanese war.

The dilemma that Afghan modernists like Tarzi were facing was the question of, how to Modernize the country and to preserve its independence and monarchy. While they failed to find an immediate solution to that dilemma, they thought they saw a long range solution: in nationalism they foresaw a force mighty enough to protect Afghan sovereignty and permit Afghanistan to modernize itself unhindered.

2.10 Nationalism in Afghanistan

In order to legitimate the idea of Afghan nationalism, Tarzi and his

associates had to do two things; firstly, to convince people that the idea of nationalism does not contradict the Islamic theory of brotherhood, and secondly to convince them that modernization is compatible with Islam. To the first aim, he distinguished between the Islamic community and the small Islamic entities. It is true, he argued that Muslims are brothers, but every entity within that great community has the right to love and defend the place where he lives. To support his contention that the very concept of an Afghan ethos and fatherland emanated from Islam, he quoted as saying of the Prophet Muhammad: *Hob ul watan min al iman* (patriotism derives from faith).

Furthermore, he argued that the Afghans have accepted Islam by grace and will of God. And given the fact that Afghanistan was a God given country, thus love of the fatherland was divinely ordained.

The next dilemma that Tarzi was facing was, how to link nationalism with modernization to overcome religious resistance. Only through modernization could the Afghan kingdom defend itself and Islam against the insatiable appetite of European imperialists. For, he argued, true patriotism thus went beyond the willingness to fight in defense of the fatherland; it necessarily entailed the desire to reform and modernize the fatherland as well.

Tarzi and his associates formed a group of scholars to develop historical rationalism. Their task was to do comparative studies to discover the source of success and weaknesses of different civilizations, in order to secure the future of their own country.

To conclude or summarize the whole chapter it can be stated that Afghanistan as it is today had a long journey, has to yet to emerge as a one nation.

But Social cleavages between some ethnic, linguistic, religious, regional and economic groups frequently cause or worsen fragmentation, undercutting the concept of the nation and thereby posing challenges to reconstruction and other aspects of peace-building. Therefore there are some problems to solve in Afghan nation building process Afghanistan has often been described as a tribal confederation, comprising of multi-racial groups and nationalities. The leading group, both in economic and numerical terms, is the Pashtuns. During hundred years all afghan ethnic, linguistic, religious groups live together with peace and respect with each other's.

Today, the struggle for nation-building in Afghanistan is, in fact, a struggle for reviving of the enlightened polity ruined by the post-Cold War politics; building on the historical and civilizational foundations of the state and bridging the Afghan nation with the contemporary world in a more democratic and peaceful manner.

Nevertheless, negotiations have always played a more critical role than war in Afghanistan. It's abundantly clear that the democratic and political transformations, that have taken place over the experiences of four decades in war, migration and poverty, prevent the militants from getting any social legitimacy from their ideology and networking in the country.

Now the circumstances have changed. The state in Afghanistan appears stronger than ever before.

So, our main focus is on process of nation building in Afghanistan after 9/11 and the role of USA, we will discuss more on policy of USA regarding nation building in Afghanistan.

RESULT

The nation building in Afghanistan officially has been started since Amanullah Khan kingdom ship. Furthermore, non-existence of a real statics of nations, emigration low of knowledge, racism, party spirit and security problems are the main problems regarding nation building which grab the promotion in the nation building. The nation building progress is depending on a real statics of nations and giving their rights though elimination of shortage which is the main reason for emigration on other hand, socialization of government between nations and giving attention of education sector to diminish the low level of knowledge.

As matter fact, the statics of nation soon it will solve meanwhile knowledge cause in both of them since decade are in core of government plans but the problems of security which is the main reason for shortage and emigration will take a lot time because it is not

on the control of Afghanistan government. Shortly we can say the nation building in Afghanistan rather it started since long time but it doesn't realize as much as it expects up to some extent it promoted.

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