Pakistan has a long and symbiotic relationship with China. The than seas’ in the region. Pakistan’s anti – India stance has always been secured partner in the Indian Ocean and it fits into the geo-political helped it in two ways, first it could be taken as a reliable and "multi-dimensional " strategic cooperation with the countries in this region. In this regard, Pakistan remains the first expanse “ Pakistan remains faithful partner of China: long-standing ties between the two countries have been mutually supportive. A close identity of views and mutual interests remain the hallmark of bilateral ties. Since the 1962 Sino-Indian War, Pakistan has supported China on most issues of importance to the latter, especially those related to the question of China’s sovereignty like Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet and other sensitive issues such as human rights.

Diplomatic relations between Pakistan and China were established on 21 May 1951, shortly after the defeat of the Republic of China in 1949. While initially ambivalent towards the idea of a Communist country on its borders, Pakistan hoped that China would serve as a counterweight to Indian influence. India had recognized China a year before, and Indian Prime Minister Nehru also hoped for closer relations with the Chinese. Since 9/11, Pakistan has increased the scope of Chinese influence and support by agreeing to a number of military projects, combined with extensive economic support and investment from the Chinese.

This is primarily due to Pakistan’s strategy of playing off the two powers against each other, but also a genuine effort to prevent America’s influence in the region from becoming too strong. In return, the Chinese hope to strengthen Pakistan as a counterbalance to American and Indian influence.

Wider Proliferation Circle: China has been instrumental in assisting Pakistan is becoming a nuclear power as well as providing the delivery means for its nuclear arsenal. The start of China’s terrible record of proliferating nuclear weapons goes back to 1983. In 1986 Chinese scientists assisted the Kahuta Laboratories to solve problems on their uranium enrichment centrifuges.

Pakistan’s first nuclear device was tested at Lop Nor in China in 1990. China is now providing technology to Pakistan to develop the alternate plutonium route for production of nuclear weapons. Likewise, having initially provided M-9 missile to Pakistan, it has the alternate plutonium route for production of nuclear weapons. Likewise, having initially provided M-9 missile to Pakistan, it has

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Pakistan’s first nuclear device was tested at Lop Nor in China in 1990. China is now providing technology to Pakistan to develop the alternate plutonium route for production of nuclear weapons. Likewise, having initially provided M-9 missile to Pakistan, it has paid for Pakistan’s acquisition of Nodong and Taepodong missile from North Korea. Currently, most of the hardware for the Pakistan military, such as tanks, artillery, aircraft and communication equipment is being provided by China either gratis or at friendly rates. During Pakistan Prime Minister Gilani’s visit to China in May, 2011, the schedule for providing 50 JF-17 Fighter Aircraft was expedited and negotiations for providing J-20 stealth fighters commenced.

The opening of the Karakoram Highway (KKH) which connect the two, the laying of a gas pipeline from Gwadar Pasni to Xinjiang and literally leaving the Gilgit – Baltistan region to China for development are indicative of the close strategic relationship between the two nations. According to media report, as many as 11,000 Chinese personnel, including soldiers, engineers, technicians and labor, are present in the Gilgit-Baltistan area. Not with standing the irritable of Pak-based Uighur fundamental Islamic groups creating unrest in Xinjiang and the deaths of number of Chinese due to Islamic terrorist acts with in Pakistan, the relation between the two countries continues to grow.
In the long-term horizon, the relations between China and Pakistan will remain good. Pakistan has a long and symbiotic relationship with China. The long-standing ties between the two countries have been mutually supportive. A close identity of views and mutual interests remain the hallmark of bilateral ties. Since the 1962 Sino-Indian War, Pakistan has supported China on most issues of importance to the latter, especially those related to the question of China's sovereignty like Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet and other sensitive issues such as human rights.

**Chinese Nuclear Missile Assistance to Pakistan:**

Diplomatic relations between Pakistan and China were established on 21 May 1951, shortly after the defeat of the Republic of China in 1949. While initially ambivalent towards the idea of a Communist country on its borders, Pakistan hoped that China would serve as a counterweight to Indian influence. India had recognized China a year before, and Indian Prime Minister Nehru also hoped for closer relations with the Chinese. Since 9/11, 2001, Pakistan has increased the scope of Chinese influence and support by agreeing to a number of military projects, combined with extensive economic support and investment from the Chinese. This is partially due to Pakistan's strategy of playing off the two powers against each other, but also a genuine effort to prevent America's influence in the region from becoming too strong. In return, the Chinese hope to strengthen Pakistan as a counterbalance to American and Indian influence and China and Pakistan are involved in several projects to enhance military and weaponry systems, which include the development of the Chinese made Pakistan JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft, K-8 Karakorum advance training aircraft, a tailor made training aircraft for the Pakistan Air Force based on the Chinese domestic Hongdu L-15, space technology, AWACS systems, Al-Khalid tanks, which China granted free license production and tailor made modifications based on the initial Chinese Type 90 and/or MBT-2000 and also the Chinese gave significant technical assistance in the Pakistani development of the Babur cruise missile. The Chinese has designed tailor made advanced weapons for Pakistan, making it a strong military power in the Asian region.

**Gwadar Sea Port Development:**

The Chinese penetration with economic purpose having strategic clouds with Pakistan will certainly a step forward for other smaller countries to get inspired for better ties with China. In keeping with its economic and strategic expansion, China has developed its strategic influence in the region with India's other neighbor's like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Bhutan. Among these, Bangladesh deserves an analysis. Gwadar Port China is the largest investor in the Gwadar Deep Sea Port, which is strategically located at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz. It is viewed wary by both America and India as a possible launch pad for the Chinese Navy, giving them a good ability to launch submarines and warships in the Indian Sea. However the Gwadar Port is currently delayed due to a multilateral diplomatic standoff between the project leaders and the Singapore government.

China has offered Pakistan military aid in order to fight against terrorism in Pakistan. Pakistan has purchased military equipment from China in order to bolster their efforts against Islamic militants. In the past, China has played a major role in the development of Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure, especially when increasingly stringent export controls in Western countries made it difficult for Pakistan to acquire materials and uranium enriching equipment from elsewhere. China has supplied Pakistan with equipment to advance their nuclear weapons program, such as the Chinese help in building the Khushab reactor, which plays a key role in Pakistan's production of plutonium. A subsidiary of the China National Nuclear Corporation contributed in Pakistan's efforts to develop its uranium enrichment capabilities by providing 5,000 customs made ring magnets, which are a key component of the equipments that facilitate the high-speed rotation of centrifuges. China has also provided technical and material support in the completion of the Chashma Nuclear Power Complex and plutonium reprocessing facility, which was built in the mid 1990s. China may also have supplied nuclear technology to the Pakistanis, enabling Pakistan to become a nuclear state with an estimated 100 warheads as of 2011.

The support with which China and Pakistan give each other is considered important in global diplomacy, and has been compared to Israel – United States relations. According to a Pew survey of Pakistan public opinion in 2010, 84 percent of respondents said they had a favorable view of China and 16 percent had a favorable view of the United States. Gwadar is strategically located at the apex of the Arabian Sea and at the mouth of the Persian Gulf and is the location of Gwadar Port, a newly-built strategic warm-water, deep-sea port, which was developed by the Government of Pakistan at a cost of USD $248 million and inaugurated by the President of Pakistan on 20 March 2007.[3]

The M-11 Transfer was actually a smokescreen for the transfer of an entire M 9 factory to Pakistan and that explains the discrepancy in the figures. At a congressional hearing in 1992, the CIA spokesmen made it clear that in the light of the M 11 transfer he could not explain the information they received about the M 9 transfers. China at the time was not and is still not a member of MTCR which has a 300 kms limit on the transfer of missiles. The ghost of Gwadar is back, looming large again as China gears up to assume operational control of this strategic deep sea port close to the Strait of Hormuz. The recent decision of the Pakistan Cabinet to transfer the functional responsibility for this port from the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) to a Chinese company (China's Overseas Port Holding) has sent alarming signals to India as this port has larger strategic implications. India is concerned as the port offers an exceptional much-desired strategic depth not only to Pakistan but also cements China's foothold in the Indian Ocean region.

The move is a win-win situation for both Pakistan and China. For Pakistan, the Chinese takeover serves the purpose of closer Sino-Pak economic cooperation and possibly a greater engagement on security issues. A fully operational Gwadar port means the end of near-total dependence on a relatively vulnerable Karachi. Even prior to the completion Pakistan had started considering Gwadar as an important naval base after Karachi and Ormara in an attempt to improve Pakistan's maritime security posture. Karachi, which lies about 470 km east of Gwadar, was effectively blockaded during the India-Pakistan war of 1971. Gwadar, located much further to the west, away from the Indian coast, will certainly provide a safe alternative for Pakistan to improve military flexibility. For the Chinese, Gwadar has the strategic significance of being close to the Strait of Hormuz. The Gwadar-Karakoram link road will offer strategic access to the Indian Ocean as well as greater economic benefits to its restive Xinjiang province. It will also Beijing to ensure better security of its energy shipments along the existing maritime links and oil imports from the Gulf to the Xinjiang region through overland. Perhaps, the proposed multi-model Gwadar-Kashgar road, rail and gas-oil pipeline links will put to rest the much discussed China’s Malacca dilemma. Besides, on the security front with a listening post, China will be able to monitor US naval activities in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Aden, activities of the Indian Navy and future India-US cooperation in the Arabian Sea.

Besides the road links, China and Pakistan are also planning to build a railway link between Xingjiang and Gwadar, almost parallel to the Karakoram Highway. The proposed railway would run through Gwadar and is expected to join Pakistan railway network for further connection to Gwadar. This rail link is not only aimed for economic benefits, but also to carry oil from the Persian Gulf to Xinjiang in case the pipeline option turns out unfeasible. Energy transportation through the comparatively secure Gwadar-Xinjiang overland corridor would always be an easier and faster option for China. The distance from Kashgar to Gwadar through the overland route is about 1000 miles while the present oil shipments from the gulf region cover a distance of more than 3500 miles in reaching to the east coast of China through the Malacca Straits. An apprehensive India, soon after the commencement of the Gwadar project, decided to help Iran in developing the Chabahar
Robert Kaplan calls the "collapse of distance brought about by People's Liberation Army (PLA), however, arise primarily from what Asia-Pacific. Indian concerns about the modernization of Washington's recently announced "rebalancing strategy" for the competition with the United States, particularly in light of China's military modernization and grand strategy is geopolitical comprehensive national power and regional military capability. Beijing is severely depreciating its area of influence. Furthermore, the extended Indian Ocean region (IOR), where New Delhi believes emergence as the most influential actor in Asia—one with the "smile is characteristic of Chinese diplomacy.

Policy Implications
- The coming period is full of strategic vulnerability for India. India needs to fast-track its plans for military modernization and its procedures for procurement.
- India needs to develop a strong bilateral relationship with its partners, based on a congruence of strategic interests, as a hedge against China.
- To build its indigenous defense capability and industrial base, India needs to seriously examine offers of defense cooperation, particularly in critical areas.
- India needs to initiate a full proof maritime strategy and maritime cooperation among the Asian littorals in order to establish a strong hold on sea lines of communication.

India's strategic concerns regarding China arise from the latter's emergence as the most influential actor in Asia—one with the ability to shape the future balance of power. What is even more worrisome to India is growing Chinese influence in South Asia and the extended Indian Ocean region (IOR), where New Delhi believes Beijing is severely depreciating its area of influence. Furthermore, China is backing its aggressive assertions with a steady buildup of comprehensive national power and regional military capability.

There is a general understanding in India that the main focus of China's military modernization and grand strategy is geopolitical competition with the United States, particularly in light of Washington's recently announced "rebalancing strategy" for the Asia-Pacific. Indian concerns about the modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), however, arise primarily from what Robert Kaplan calls the "collapse of distance brought about by advances in military technology," allowing countries to encroach on each other's sphere of influence. Although China tends to underplay the threat from India, both in terms of India's military modernization and existing capabilities, Beijing has recently exhibited a tendency to look at these capabilities from the larger perspective of strategic collusion between India and the United States.

Conclusion: A central feature of Chinese strategic is to persist with a policy of no-compromise on core strategic issues and to try and win a war without having to fight a battle.

China continues to delay delineation of the LAC and resolve the boundary dispute. The Chinese strategic presence in the POK particularly the Northern areas of Gilgit-Baltistan which has been accepted by them as a disputed area in 1963-64 is a collusive venture. It is also becoming shrill on its recent claim over Arunachal Pradesh. As China’s comprehensive power grows, diplomatic and ground pressure on disputes will keep building. Ambiguity with smile is characteristic of Chinese diplomacy.

Pragmatism demands that we do all that we can to contain our differences with China and prevent a two-front war situation. We can continue to build economic links which have made impressive strides, and separate our bilateral differences from the global issues on which we can work together to mutual advantage. However, at the end of the day, India's ability to deal with its external security challenges will be determined by its own comprehensive national will, and tangible power in its economic and military spheres.

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