Volume : VI, Issue : I, January - 2017

Refuting Epistemological Realism

Shumye Getu

Abstract :

 Do we have knowledge of the world as the epistemological realists’ assumption or impossible in the way sceptics’ objects? And if our knowledge of the world is possible in which kinds of conditions and by what kinds of reasons or arguments it is grounded. The epistemological realists do not understand what they are talking about because knowledge of the world is not undefined epistemic concept as they made it unexplained. They did not conceptualize it in a way that we can explain. As a result sceptics attack on the generality of knowledge of the world is inevitable. Michael Williams contends to conclude that there is knowledge of the world as an object of theory but not in a way that epistemological realists assume and it should be understood we believe about the world amounts to knowledge we need a way of reducing our beliefs to order. We need different cases of knowledge of the world as an example or we need to individuate the general knowledge of the world because the method epistemological realist employed is defective.

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Article: Download PDF   DOI : 10.36106/ijsr  

Cite This Article:

Shumye Getu, Refuting Epistemological Realism, International Journal of Scientific Research, Volume : 6 | Issue : 1 | JANUARY 2017

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